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Contrary to two conventions the Editors have sorted their names in reverse alphabetical order, and refuse to take total responsibility for the good work that is here. We are, however, in keeping with a good convention, responsible for any remaining defects.

Brendan O'Leary, London
Ian Lustick, Philadelphia
Tom Callaghy, Philadelphia
August 2000

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2

The Elements of Right-Sizing and Right-Peopling the State

Brendan O'Leary

As you know it is always the powerful who dictate what the borders will be, never the weak. Thus we must be powerful.

Slobodan Milosevic, speaking to the Serbian Parliament in April 1991 (cited in Cigar 1995: 42).

This era does not reward people who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood.

President William Jefferson Clinton, speaking in Pakistan, March 2000 (cited in *Economist* Editorial 2000: 18).

States are, of course, more than territories with borders. They also encapsulate peoples, be they citizens, subjects, immigrants, refugees, or metics. And the relationships between borders and peoples are profoundly interdependent. 'Right-Sizing' and 'right-peopling' may be the two most important imperatives of successful state-builders and state-managers. It makes sense therefore to locate the general elements of a broad theory of right-sizing the state within social and political frameworks that address

(1) the distinctiveness of borders in our modern world;
(2) the pivotal nature of nationality and ethnicity which makes public officials deeply concerned with 'right-peopling' their states; and
(3) territorial expansion, maintenance, and contraction which oblige public officials to consider 'right-sizing', if only tacitly.

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These elements can be found respectively in the work of Ernest Gellner, in the literature on national and ethnic conflict regulation, and in the work of Ian Lustick.

The Distinctiveness of our States and our World

Three major stages in human history are identified in Gellner's philosophy of history, namely *foragia*, *agraria*, and *industria*, and two episodic revolutionary transformations, namely the *neolithic* and the *industrial* (Gellner 1964, 1983, 1988a, b). Each stage has characteristic forms of production, coercion, and cognition. The three stages apply to world-history as a whole because not every historic human collectivity has been through all three. Perhaps hundreds of thousands of human collectivities were wiped out in foragia—by nature, by their rivals, or, later on, by agrarians and industrials. Likewise perhaps thousands were destroyed in agraria—by nature, by their rivals, or, later on, by industrials. Industrial societies are much less numerous than foragian or agrarian entities, and are not likely ever to number exponentially more than presently exist. But industria is inexorably absorbing, or destroying, the last remnants of foragia and agraria. This triadic conception of history has obvious implications for theories of the state, their peoples, their sizes, and their external and internal territorial markings.

Foragia

Foragia is a state-free zone, both in space and time. Hunters and gatherers and nomads do not require statal organization, though nomads can be state-makers. Foragers are acephalous anarchists and are egalitarian in a brutal if not always Hobbesian way; arbitration is performed by holy men rather than governors (Gellner 1969). Foragers are not easily taxed; their mobility and lack of fixed properties make them free. Foraging collectors are, at least potentially, pacific; nomads, however, are more likely to be thieves and thugs. In a solely foragian world nomads recognize prey and roam through landscapes, but they do not have political borders. Physical or weather zones that affect the consumption of their herds, by contrast, are of major importance. Likewise, hunters and gatherers slash, burn, and roam, but do not settle permanently, and do not have territories, or borders in our senses—though they may confine their slashing, burning, and roaming to specific 'natural' locations. Foragers, in short, do not 'right-size' because they have no states, though they have to right-size their populations, or nature will do that task for them in her characteristically maternal way. The political theory of the Stone Age demonstrates in short that we are not genetically given to organizing ourselves through sovereign political borders. Given the age of the human species, we are, most likely, genetically adapted to being hunters, opportunistic foragers, and shepherds. We have no trans-historical 'territorial imperative'.

Agraria

Agraria by contrast, has statal characteristics. Stationary populations formed, and reformed, throughout the post-neolithic millennia. 'Caging theory' synthesizes the perspectives of those who see the origins of the state in conquest, and those who see its origins in the defence of property (O'Leary 1989: 309–16). The first victims of the state were trapped when clusters of population developed beside great rivers—made possible by alluvial agriculture. Their comparative wealth permitted incipient urbanization, but made them vulnerable to conquest by militarized nomads, who could control them and extract resources from them, confident that their subjects could, or would, no longer return to the wild.[1] A complementary tale suggests that the incipient cities, aware of the annual pillages, regular sacks, and incessant rapes of the nomads, learned to defend themselves, and thereby invented rudimentary statal forms.

The major form of production, agriculture, creates fixed investment in fertile land that can be captured. The state begins, so to speak, as a granary rather than as a slaughterhouse. The exemplary political form of agraria, what Gellner termed the 'agro-literate empire', is significantly assisted by its most important cognitive techniques, writing and counting, monopolized by castes of specialists. Agraria is in this respect, and many others, profoundly inegalitarian; and made so by the scarce surplus of extractable resources, and by the pervasive lack of (social) cognitive power on the part of most of its populations. It is typically severely caste-ridden: people are hunted and gathered, shepherded and 'domesticated', ranked and sorted, generally tied to the land by force and dependency, and, not least, by ignorance. Stocks in slavery and serfdom do well. Social mobility, horizontal and vertical, is extremely limited.

The typical agro-literate empire had external frontiers, not borders in our sense, and perpetually faced the question of 'right-locating' those frontiers. Its most sharply delineated political borders were internal: structured by past conquests and fiscal imperatives. An empire was characteristically based on a

[1] The *Book of Genesis*, which gets most big things wrong, has Cain, 'a tiller of the ground', killing Abel 'a keeper of sheep'. It is more likely that the transition from foragia to agraria saw Abel and his fellow nomads form states through 'shepherding' the Cains and putting them to work.

dualist form, the basis of the distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics. A 'core' or 'court' made claims to numerous farms, estates, and cities—in which craftsmen lived and between which merchants roamed. It did so through intermediaries, tax-farmers, and officials, while leaving the multiple peripheries—subjects, and their subjects—to various forms of limited self-government. The core, through its generally thieving intermediaries, extracted from these peripheries whatever share of rents, tributes, and taxes it could.

Agraria was the time of the thugs who called themselves the best: nobles, or aristocrats. They were by training, maximally predatory, their rapacity limited only by four general social constraints.

1. The first was set by the limits to fiscal or tributary extraction. Beyond certain thresholds peasants, serfs, and slaves could not deliver surpluses to lords and overlords without counter-productive demographic attrition, colloquially known as death, or mass flight. Beyond another threshold, urban merchants and craftsmen migrated, if they could, to less inhospitable empires, or they abandoned their precarious occupations and returned to the land, if they could. Rational emperors controlled the rapacious propensities of their intermediaries—fleecing their subjects in ways that encouraged them to believe that being a sheep was not so bad after all. It was not for nothing that mercantilists thought that people were wealth, and that mercantilist rulers sought to limit, and indeed forbid, emigration.[2] In agraria right-peopling was about having a high volume human herd.

2. The second limit was set by military logistics. The agro-literate empire found the maintenance and use of standing armies and navies enormously costly: they comprised the overwhelmingly largest component of the imperial 'budget' (Mann 1984). The scope of imperial power was doubly circumscribed by limits to fiscal extraction to sustain its military prowess, and by the potentially ruinous consequences of imperial overreach (Kennedy 1988).

3. The third was 'civilizational'. An agro-literate empire, which began as a city-state, or from the fusion of nomadic conquerors with city-states, found it profitable, and indeed imperative, to expand and conquer all the urban literates and extractable surplus-producing agrarians that lay within the range of its military capacity. It had to expand or die at the hands of its rivals, but there was a limit to expansion. It was rational to expand until the empire was entirely surrounded by foragers and nomads—some of which, over time, were progressively acculturated, assimilated, or in a word, civilized. The marchlands, where the militarized barbarian nomads roamed, marked the

[2] An emigration tax, 'Free or Departure Money', was imposed on the estates of would be migrants from Germany until the early nineteenth century (Enzensberger 1990: 119).

limits to rational conquest and incorporation. No stable and reliable taxation could be garnered from the marchlands; and incorporating them threatened 'imperial overreach'.

4. The last constraint was normative. Though the authenticity and efficacy of the taboos and restraints that world-religions placed upon rulers varied across time, space, and individuals, they were not null, and partially inhibited the ambitions of kings and emperors, embedding tacit wisdom about the limits of sustainable rule, and telling them which lands could be justly conquered, and which peoples justly enslaved or killed.

The 'laws of motion' of the agro-literate empire suggested a logic of right-shaping the imperial apparatus and right-locating the imperial frontiers. Autonomy to imperial officials, tax-farmers, or feudal aristocrats had to be circumscribed, to prevent loss of fiscal resources and to inhibit fiscal rebellions, and not least to constrain the incipient emergence of rival courts. The extractors of resources from fiscal units, which sometimes had sharply delimited borders, were rotated, or required to have their demesnes regularly re-approved; or were subjected to overlapping and competitive jurisdictions, likely to be carved out under weak courts.

Frontiers, by contrast, had to be organized according to military and civilizational priorities.[3] Immediately contiguous rival agrarian empires had to be conquered, incorporated or destroyed; if not, they would do it to you. *Carthago delenda est*, that was Scipio and the prophets of agraria. Frontiers had to be defended 'in depth', not as neat territorial lines. Physical barriers that blocked entry, such as daunting mountains, rivers, swamps, and deserts, were excellent protections. In this sense the frontiers of agraria were 'natural'—that is, natural to agraria. They were pitched at the interface with barbarians who generally continued to dwell and roam in the aforementioned mountains, rivers, swamps, and deserts. If necessary, walls and fortifications were built to provide surveillance and to engage in punishment-raids (massacres) on those nomads who lay within inexpensive striking-range. Military governors in frontier-regions had to be family court-members, or were regularly redeployed to prevent them acquiring imperial ambitions above their station. Precious resources were not wasted in attempting to subdue inaccessible foragians.

The governing imperatives of right-shaping and right-sizing the agro-literate empire were therefore straightforward:

[3] The late Samuel Finer argued that 'In Britain we call a hard line, which marks out sovereign territory, a frontier; we call a blurred, fluctuating, and debatable area a border (the Latin *limes*). The Americans use the terms in exactly the reverse sense' (1997: 10). This has not been my experience of English usage across both sides of the Atlantic, but usage here will be what Finer terms American, or rather Irish and American.

(1) to expand courtly extractive capacity to the limits of fiscal, military, and civilizational possibilities; and
(2) to divide and rule, or regularly restructure the imperial apparatus, especially its tax-extractors and generals, if only to prevent their vampire-like thirsts from leaving insufficient blood-supplies for the court.[4]

What is striking to modern, or industrial, eyes is that the agro-literate empire, Roman or otherwise, did not require the governed to be co-cultural with the governors. The 'right people', apart from those at the court, did not require any particular cultural characteristics, other than being agrarians. The culturally homogeneous empire, and conversely, the culture which possessed its own territorial kingdom co-extensive with that of its influence, were seldom found in agraria. On the contrary, the cultural differentiation of diverse layers of the population, including the rulers, was highly functional for the imperial rulers, and, according to Gellner, was seldom resented and often warmly approved—if only by the diverse scribes who worked for the ruler(s). The agro-literate empire looked like a painting by Kokoschka, a riot of diverse points of colour (Gellner 1983: 139). Though the picture as a whole has a pattern, in its details it is not easy to see it. The peripheries are multiple, various, culturally heterogeneous: only the imperial court and its frontiers give overarching meaning to the whole.

Industria vs. Agraria

Industria differs radically from agraria. Its peoples have escaped the Malthusian trap. Its most fortunate—liberal democratic welfare capitalist—

[4] *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire* is a superb exposition of the imperatives facing the exemplary agro-literate empire in European history (Luttwak 1999 (1976)). Luttwak identifies three systems of Roman imperial security strategy: for the periods of expansionism, territorial stabilization and sheer survival respectively. Each 'integrated diplomacy, military force, road networks, and fortifications to serve a common objective' (ibid. 4) The initial Julio-Claudian system, like its successors, was based on a careful economy of force. There was no demarcated imperial frontier and no system of fixed frontier defences; nor were the legions housed in permanent fortresses. The legions were not deployed to defend the adjacent ground but rather 'to serve as mobile striking forces' (ibid. 18). 'There was no *limes*, in its later sense of a fortified and guarded border'· [the word] described a route of penetration cut through hostile territory rather than a 'horizontal' frontier (ibid. 19). In short, the first grand strategy involved the absence of perimeter defence. Within a zone of direct control disposable and concentrated forces were available for wars of conquest and the intimidation or 'suasion' of clients. Beyond this core was a zone of client states that were responsible for their own security, and beyond them (stateless) client tribes—and in these sectors Roman diplomacy operated vigilantly. In its second phase of strategic development the Roman Empire came to resemble the modern state—in its territoriality, in the incorporation of the client states and tribes within the zone of direct Roman governance, and in the evolution of a permanent, 'scientific' frontier defence, maintained through a network of fortifications. Had Rome been wholly successful it may have become the first modern state—it is no accident that the state-builders of early modern Europe did so within its long cultural and institutional shadow (Anderson 1974).

peoples continue to experience sustained economic growth across generations, cumulative and positive-sum growth. Wealth no longer lies primarily in land or landed serfs, slaves, and debtors. Wealth is capital, produced in goods and services—increasingly in weightless and invisible media—produced by literate and numerate urban peoples, engaged in an exceedingly complex division of labour. These peoples are, however, actually or latently, culturally homogenized. To Gellner they resemble a painting by Modigliani: with sharp blunt artificial lines, and with relatively rare clashes of colours and blurring of lines (ibid. 139–40). They have modern borders, though the lines are generally not created by artists but rather by great powers, genocidal officials, ethnic cleansers, and coercive assimilationists. Occasionally treaties that reflect authentic agreements created them. In fact, treaties on maritime borders are the most Modigliani-like, blunt, artificial lines, created with rational zig-zags suited for the granting of rectangular oil and mineral exploration rights.

Agrarian societies too had complicated divisions of labour but, by comparison, they had little cultural homogeneity. Agrarians expressed and recognized their identities in their social status. They were not co-nationals. Co-nationality, at least in Gellner's theory, requires the egalitarianism of industria. A nationality must not only be conscious of itself, but convinced that the ethnic boundary which separates itself from others ought to be a political one—that the boundaries of nationality should also be the borders of the state or a political unit, and, above all, that at least some of the rulers of the state should be of the same nationality as the ruled. Foreigners are generally unwelcome—though calibrated immigration programmes are possible and widespread—especially as rulers.

So, industria is both statal and national. The officials of the successful industrial state are infrastructural managers and maintenance engineers, and may be (should be) much less rapacious predators than their agro-literate imperial predecessors; and this despite the fact that they have much more potential power. The industrial state, because of the technology it can deploy or command, is potentially more despotic, pervasive, brutal, and appalling than any of its agrarian predecessors, and it has displayed these traits many times in the century just gone,[5] its most politically and economically

[5] No barbarians, not even Genghis Khan and his hordes, are guilty of the magnitude of mass murder of modern state-killers. The genocidal rulers (and their collaborators) of Nazi Germany, of late Ottoman Turkey, of modern Burundi and Rwanda, and the politicidal Marxist-Leninist rulers of the USSR, the Balkans, China, Korea, and the Horn of Africa are 'democidal' killers, mass murderers of peoples on a historically unprecedented scale (Rummel 1997 (1994)). Rummel names the Soviet Union, Communist China, Nazi Germany, and the Kuomintang Chinese regime as 'dekamegamurderers', and describes two of the states discussed in this book—Turkey, Chapter 8, and Pakistan, Chapter 9—as amongst the 'lesser megamurderers'.

successful exemplars succeed because they are not merely the instruments of rapacious élites. In industria a high-quality, high-productivity set of culturally homogenized thoroughbreds is preferred by rational rulers to the mass herd of agraria.

Industria is statal in a much sharper territorial way than the loose agglomerates and dual polities of agraria. Modern states have borders—precise cartographically represented lines, entrenched in bilateral and multilateral treaties, which specifically demarcate their territories from those of other states. Sometimes these cartographic statements are physically expressed in electric fences and walls, but they are more often signified by border posts and patrols on land, at sea, and in the air. By contrast, pre-modern or pre-statal systems had 'frontiers', that is, their cores were surrounded by military zones in which they disputed and faced the enemy. Frontiers were zones of conflict rather than demarcated lines or borders. They were not tightly specified. Even where Roman and Chinese emperors built walls these represented military bases rather than strict borders; they sought, successfully, to exercise manifest power as well as influence well beyond the walls manned by their armies.[6]

The contrast between an ideal typical modern state and an agro-literate empire is immediate and striking: in the modern state the economic, administrative, and internal military domains of the state are, in principle, identical. Within its well-bordered territory the grip of the state, and its extractive and policy-making agencies, is presumptively of equal and uniform capacity; and there is, in principle, no differentiation between an inner and outer military frontier. Sovereignty is territorially uniform; no zones are recognized in which state-sanctioned law does not apply: 'no go' zones are an abomination. That is what is meant when it is said that a state's internal sovereignty is recognized.

It is not essential that the modern state's territory be a single, contiguous geographical land mass, though this option is preferred by nationalist image-makers, and by generals keen on 'natural' lines of defence. But military industria, at the limit, tends towards the abolition of geography. States can be composed of a mainland and islands, and part of an island, for example the rump of the British Empire styles itself the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Another state can separate the state's territory, as Canada separates Alaska from the continental USA, and Quebec may one day separate the rest of Canada into two halves. Nor need the state be the exclusive sovereign of all its territory: condominiums are possible, though

[6] The history of imperial China suggests that the internal integration of its successive empires before the fifteenth century was profoundly limited (Lattimore 1940 (1988)). The parallels with the Roman Empire are evident (see e.g. Lintott 1993: esp. ch. 3).

rare entities. But these are qualifications. The territorial attributes of a respected and self-respecting state require some exclusively delimited area in which it enjoys a monopoly of sovereignty.

The optimal specimens of industria, from the perspective of prosperity and stability, are national-statal. Many thinkers tacitly or explicitly assume that industria will, eventually, be cosmopolitan, and that nationalism is merely a phenomenon of the transition from agraria to global industria (e.g. Held 1990). If Gellner was right, they are wrong. Nationalism exists and will persist because it is a necessary component even of mature industria; and is expressed perhaps especially acutely in the more representative and democratic political systems that are its accompaniments.

Gellner's account of why we industrials are mostly nationalists is well known, and need only be brutally summarized here.[7] Agrarian village-communities possessed neither the means nor the incentives for literacy, or abstract communication. There was a marked discontinuity between High Culture and Low Culture, or between High Tradition and Little Tradition. The political relationship between the two varied from one civilization to another, but there was a general pattern: a discontinuity between high, literate, education-transmitted spiritually formulated culture, and a low oral culture, transmitted without much or any assistance from full-time cultural specialists or prescriptive and codified educators. Industria is different. For the great majority 'work' involves the interpretation, selection, and transmission of messages, not the direct transformation of nature. High or literate or education-transmitted culture is the pervasive possession of the overwhelming majority. Citizens owe their employability, cultural participation, and status as civic equals to skills that can only be acquired by passing through a continuous all-embracing educational system, operating in a standardized linguistic or cultural medium. The most important possession of the modern person is access to that shared literate high culture. It is this that makes her predisposed to be a nationalist, not least because that high culture is some particular high culture, with expectations about the typical traits displayed by bearers of that culture—be they oral sounds, skin pigmentation, religion believed by ancestors, or whatever.

If this story is broadly correct, industria provides systemic incentives for two forms of social boundary-drawing: between high-cultured populations and those still in agraria and foragia; and between rival high-cultured populations. These are, implicitly, the latent bases of territorial political borders in industria, if Gellner's interpretation of modernity is essentially correct. If it is, then these latènt bases constrain the ambitions of those concerned to

[7] For the theory's nuances and for criticisms see O'Leary (1998 and forthcoming).

'right-size' their states. It suggests that there will be ethnic and national cleavages that 'right-sizers' can adjust, manipulate, and attempt to restructure—but public officials do not have the wholesale autonomy suggested by naïve social constructionists; they 'receive history' in ways that they do not choose.

It is easiest to understand the first potential border: it is analogous to that which existed at the civilizational frontiers between agrarians and foragians. The second border, by contrast, has material and cultural foundations of a different order. Industria, as Trotsky argued, arrives in combined and uneven forms—creating enormous disparities in wealth, and in economic and political power. Antagonisms develop at the interfaces between more and less developed populations. Excluded or offended élites in backward regions may opt for protectionist development. They may perceive advantages to secession—instead of competing in a rigged game with their rivals with a more and or better established educational tradition, they can have their own states: a poor thing but our own. '*Sinn Féin*: ourselves alone', that is early industria and its prophets. The setting up of separate political units linked to standardized educational systems becomes a systemic imperative in industria, the strongest marker of the second border. That border, of course, is not merely a reflection of past or imagined material inequality; it may also be the result of the denial of recognition on the part of co-industrials who should recognize the relevant nation as of equivalent status to their own, but fail to do so. Group-arrogance and group-resentment do not disappear in industria: they take a national rather than a caste form.

This is the bare bones of the Gellnerian tale. The standardization of productive activities in industria encourages a set of internally homogeneous, externally differentiated political units, which are simultaneously cultural and political. The state is a protector of a culture; the culture is the symbolism and legitimization of the state. The number of these pure national-statal units is far smaller than that of the earlier cultural differences between peoples. Their borders now reflect, in part, the limits of some of the major high agrarian cultures, and in part, Gellner said, the points of friction 'which became septic' in the course of uneven industrial development. Minor cultural units and nuances tend to disappear; but major ones become very significant politically.

This reasoning recognizes the vigour of political nationalism in industria, and focuses not on the ownership, or control, of capital as the source of deep conflict, but rather on the nature and implications of the types of cultural skills and activities involved in modern forms of production and of social closure on life-chances (see also Parkin 1979). These are the key sources of ethno-national conflict. The theory accounts for why nationalism is so very salient in our age, and why the social prominence of cultural nuance has diminished, whilst at the same time the political significance of the few surviving cultural boundaries has greatly increased.

Four implications follow for any general theory of 'right-sizing' and 'right-peopling' the state:

1. *Optimal industrial states are not systematically driven to expand to incorporate all industrial civilized peoples.* There are systemic inhibitions on imperial expansion and these are not merely normative. The primary sources of wealth in industrial states lie in the productive skills of their peoples; not in the 'raw land' or 'raw materials' found in, or under, grounds and oceans. The industrial state, *qua* infrastructural manager, is likely to be more successful in harnessing the skills of its people if they are its nationals—and this sets an important constraint on the appropriate borders of an efficient nation-state. The wealth of nations is their (relatively free) co-nationals; whereas the wealth of emperors is (tied people) on their estates.

This proposition implicitly accepts Schumpeter's rather than Hobson's or Lenin's argument about nineteenth-century territorial imperialism—that it was a cultural hangover, a phenomenon of the transition from agraria to industria, and not a reliable guide to the future of mature industria. The first industrials, emulating their predecessors, behaved like emperors and their aristocracies, remorselessly expanding their domains, even though it often made little industrial or capitalistic sense to do so, and even though they created costly forms of governance. The territorial imperialism of the successful European, Asian, and American states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not, however, intrinsically rooted in the systemic logic of industrial society—though their respective military successes certainly were.

This does not mean that any one should deny that several states or empires sought, by war and other means most foul, to incorporate much of the modernized planet within their formal jurisdiction: the British Empire did not grow in a fit of benign sleepwalking. This ambition was pursued in the last century notably by Nazi Germany and by the USSR—at least in its revolutionary self-presentation before the years of peaceful co-existence. But they were defeated. Had Hitler succeeded, industria could have developed, so to speak, as a global South Africa under apartheid—a global racial hierarchy writ-large. But he did not. Perhaps we have been the beneficiaries of a lucky accident, but then perhaps not. Amongst other things, nationalism in other industrial states, the efficiency imperatives of industria, and the greater economic and military effectiveness of liberal democratic capitalist states, have combined to check this prospect. In short, nationalism both insists upon, and helps to preserve, plural industrial states; and industrial states can be at their most economically efficient and most militarily competent when they are national and liberal democratic. National legitimacy, enhanced by democratic mechanisms, is the open secret of stable government in industria. The numerous empires that have expired in the last two centuries suggest that this political system faced intrinsically unmanageable dilemmas in managing the transit to modernity (Lieven 1999).

2. *The nation-state is the exemplary form of the modern state.* Still more parts of the world are set to emulate this form, even though many, indeed most, states are not presently mono-ethnic or mono-national in character, and even though many may be engaged in interstate organizations or confederal unions. Nevertheless, we can expect an increasing proportion of states to have a more than titular dominant nationality. In turn, this suggests that the issues arising from the widespread existence of national and ethnic minorities present the greatest challenges to state-managers, even in the best functioning liberal democratic industrial states. For political élites in heterogeneous states the appropriateness of their borders—external and internal—will be fundamentally determined by the answer to the question: how do we manage (or eliminate) our national and ethnic minorities?

3. *The apparent rootedness of nationalism in the repercussions of industrial civilization suggests that facile cosmopolitanism will not do—either as ethics or as enlightenment.* The appeal of cultural ('national') identity is not a delusion spread by what Hobsbawm inaccurately and derisively calls the lesser-examination passing classes (Hobsbawm 1990), or by what others call muddled romantics. The Gellnerian message is powerful: the appeal of nationalism is rooted in the conditions of modern industrial life, and cannot be conjured away, either by sheer good will and the preaching of a spirit of universal brotherhood, or, for that matter, by the co-ordinated imprisonment of all extremists and the re-education of all romantics.

4. *It follows that the external borders of states in industria are subject to pressures from two sources.* One is endogenous, stemming from the imperatives of organizing a legitimate and effective industrial culture. Political managers learn that it is easiest to have borders which encompass willing potential co-nationals—that is, the *Staatsvolk* and whatever voluntary national allies it may have forged in history, plus voluntary migrants willing to shed some of their original culture in return for equal citizenship. They will, conversely, learn that it is problematic to have borders which encompass rival nationalities living within their homelands—or at least their homelands within 'historical standard time', that is, the time necessary for amnesia to suppress inconvenient national history/memory—or borders that fail to encompass all actual or potential co-culturals and co-nationals —that is, the unredeemed or 'lost' nationals living in *irredentas*. These are endogenous pressures because they will be felt within the domestic political system—whether it is democratic or not.

These pressures interact with exogenous ones flowing from the interstate-system. That system is not one in which all states are nation-states, yet; but all states, with varying degrees of hypocrisy, must pretend to be so. It is the Westphalian system modified by its encounters with nationalisms. It places normative constraints upon state-managers' considerations about their borders. It behoves them to avoid blatant breaches of the territorial integrity of other recognized states. *There is also, so to speak, a formal normative check on territorial expansion without representation.* Borders cannot, it is said by international law, be moved by force. They can only be moved by consent—presumably of the affected people(s) and the affected state(s). There is also a formal normative constraint on contraction: international law prohibits the expulsion of citizens from their states, and thereby, it is hoped, normatively checks any prospective 'down-peoplers' who might wish to offload their responsibilities for certain peoples within their current borders. The Westphalian system has been modified to pay lip-service to national self-determination, at least for regions that were the overseas possessions of European empires, but by and large it remains the case that states combine to criticize, if not always to sanction, coercive transformations of borders, whether they be ethno-nationally motivated or not.

The foregoing are the formal pieties of 'international' 'law'—in which all states are nominally equal. These pieties are most often breached by superpowers or regional powers, or by their proxies, as realists observe. Thus the USA assisted Israel's illegal—under international law—annexations, occupations, and invasions of Jordanian, Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian territories, while mobilizing a coalition of western powers to liberate—though not democratize—the oil-producing Kuwaitis from their co-national conquerors in Iraq (Finklestein 1996: ch. 3). Similarly, there was little 'international'—that is, western—protest at India's militarized absorption of Goa, Kashmir, and various princely states, as one can read in Gurharpal Singh's discussion in Chapter 5; or, as Stephen Zunes observes in Chapter 10 at Indonesia's conquest of West Irian and East Timor.

These grim tales are not, however, proof that international law provides no constraints on the managers of superpowers or regional powers. The conquering actions of Indonesia, India, and China have been glossed as historically justified retributions for the (alleged) dismemberment of these regions by European imperialists, apologies that, naturally enough, have no purchase with the East Timorese—see Chapter 10, Muslim Kashmiris—see Chapter 5, or Tibetans (Karmel 1995–6). But they are nevertheless suggestive. Superpowers and regional powers must employ the vocabulary of national self-determination even when they betray its voluntarist and consensual premises. Perhaps, as more states join the ranks of the industrialized democratic states, present hypocrisies may be replaced by effective moral codes. The reason for this hope is not mere optimism. The European and American industrialized democratic nation-states have had a half century, and some would claim longer, in which no sovereign border has been permanently adjusted except by consent: sea-borders have been adjudicated and arbitrated; and land-borders are potentially open to adjustment by democratic head-counts, as proved by the reintegration of the Saar into West Germany, the later reunification of Germany, the potential secession of Quebec, and possible reunification of Ireland.

We live in Gellner's world. Industria is sweeping away the remnants of agraria and foragia. We call it globalization, when that term is deployed in a well-specified way. Frontiers have everywhere given ground to the borders of industria, even in the people-free Antarctica. Kokoschka's riotous colours have given way to Modigliani's linear bluntness. What right-sizing strategies, as regards their borders—be they external or internal—can be adopted by managers, in the presence of ethno-national differences within their existing sovereign territory, or if they have co-nationals beyond their sovereign territory? The answers involve simple but often deadly choices over the right peoples and the right borders.

Ethno-National Strategies for Industrial and Industrializing States

The condition in which state managers confront their peoples and their borders is explored in the literature on national and ethnic conflict regulation.[8] They can choose, within constraints, to eliminate or to manage ethno-national differences. They have four domestic grand strategies for *eliminating* differences:

(1) genocide;
(2) ethnic expulsion;
(3) territorial elimination, such as permitting secession, active decolonization or partition; and
(4) political homogenization, in the form of integration—eliminating culture from the political domain by treating all as civic equals—or assimilation (encouraging acculturation and eventual fusion).

[8] See *inter alia* Connor (1994); Esman (1994); Horowitz (1985); Horowitz (1989); Lijphart (1977); and Nordlinger (1972).

They also have four grand strategies for *managing* differences:

(1) control;
(2) arbitration;
(3) territorial management through autonomy—home rule or devolution—or federation; and
(4) consociation.[9]

Some of these strategies have no immediate implications for the right-sizing of external borders. Three of the eight seek to eliminate differences within existing borders, and are what one would expect from Gellnerian theory, namely genocide, ethnic expulsions, and similitude through integration or assimilation. Let us call these 'right-peopling' homogenization strategies, where 'right' has no sense of approval on our part. Two of the eight strategies seek to manage differences through opposing principles of group-relations: domination (control) or equality (consociation). Both have significant implications for the placement of the internal political borders of the state. Arbitration seeks to manage differences within the relevant state but its territorial logics need elaboration. Explicitly territorial strategies naturally have immediate implications for the location of state borders—internal borders in the case of management strategies, such as autonomy or federation, and external borders in the case of elimination strategies, such as permitting secession, active decolonization or partition. I shall deal with these plain right-sizing strategies last. Let me deal first with the alternatives to right-sizing.

'Right-Peopling' Within Borders

The most extreme 'solutions' to ethnic difference are the most abhorrent: genocide and expulsion. Regrettably they have not proven sufficiently abhorrent to prevent some power élites from engaging in these extreme modes of right-peopling.

Genocide

Genocide is the systematic killing of a race or kind, and involves the intentional mass killing of very large numbers or proportions of unarmed or disarmed civilians of a community who share real or alleged ascriptive national or ethnic traits,[10] or the indirect physical destruction of such a community

[9] These strategies are not mutually exclusive; they may be found in combinations and targeted at the same ethnic group(s), or, alternatively, different strategies may be aimed at different ethnic groups within the same state.

[10] Harff's term 'politicide' should be employed for the politically motivated systematic mass killing of people who may or may not share ascriptive traits, and Rummel's 'democide' is the best general term for the mass murder of peoples.

through the deliberate termination of the conditions which permit its biological and social reproduction.

Genocides in the twentieth century have been perpetrated within up-sizing states, such as Nazi Germany, involuntarily down-sizing empires, such as Ottoman Turkey, and states that show no overt desire to adjust their external borders, such as Burundi and Rwanda. Despite the infamy won by the Nazi holocaust it is wishful thinking to assume that genocide has become unthinkable.[11] Since 1945 there have been partial genocides perpetrated in the Soviet Union—of the Chechens, the Ingushi, the Karachai, the Balkars, the Meskhetians, and the Crimean Tartars[12]—Burundi, Rwanda, Iraq, Paraguay, Indonesia, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, and the former Yugoslavia.

Organized 'right-peopling' through extermination by state officials[13] is more likely to occur when:

(1) an empire is being constructed and maintained, and genocide is used as a conscious policy of land acquisition, terrorization, and encouragement of mass flight, for example the killings of the Herrero in South West Africa and of the native peoples of the Americas and Australasia;
(2) an empire is being contracted into a nation-state, for example the Young Turks' treatment of the Armenians during World War 1;
(3) an ethno-national, racial, or religious community is left vulnerable in an intense phase of nation-building, especially one that lacks geo-political resources—such as its own institutions of self-rule, or links with a state in which its co-culturals are dominant or influential—and, perhaps especially, if it possesses economic superiority and cultural identifiability in conditions of industrialization, but lacks military and political power, for example Jews, Ibos, Armenians, overseas Chinese;
(4) an ethno-national, racial, or religious community is left vulnerable within a disintegrating system of control, whether organized by an empire or by a party-dictatorship, for example the orphaned national minorities in Yugoslavia;

[11] In a moment of high optimism McNeill (1986: 71) argued that Hitler's genocides of Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs had decisively tainted advocacy of the ideal of ethnic unity within an existing state, though he stopped short of using the term 'irreversibly'.

[12] Some believe that these were cases of internal expulsions because Stalin's express intention was to remove these peoples from militarily sensitive areas, and not to kill them. However, by the 'indirect destruction' element in our definition they count as partial genocides.

[13] 'Frontier genocide', by contrast, is likely to occur when settlers, possessed of technologically superior resources, displace natives from access to land. A concomitant of colonization and conquest, it occurs on the frontiers between industrial and agrarian, or between industrial and foragian peoples—sometimes with and sometimes without state sanction. 'Frontier-genocides' occurred in all the parliamentary colonies of the British empire which became the 'white dominions'.

(5) the relevant state is not democratic, or not stably democratic; and
(6) when other right-peopling or right-sizing strategies have been ruled out.

Three points need elaboration. State officials, we may hopefully presume, embark on genocide only when other options are ruled out, either on pragmatic or ideological grounds. The Nazi Judeocide was motivated by what Goldhagen calls 'eliminationist anti-Semitism', but others were targeted for mass death who were not 'Semites', and the scale and historic continuity of anti-Semitism in the German nation as a whole may reasonably be doubted (Finkelstein and Birn 1998). It was the rapid victories of Hitler's armies in the East and the ruling out of the options of expulsion and transfer of Jews to Madagascar which led to the systematic planning of the 'final solution' (Browning 1992). Up-sizing in this case facilitated genocide. Public officials may decide that certain communities are mortal threats to the life and culture of the *Staatsvolk*, and that they cannot be integrated or assimilated. They will not, almost by definition, cede authentic territorial autonomy or sovereignty to such peoples because they are considered mortal threats. And since third parties are not trusted to manage such threats, decision-makers with this mentality are left three options: control, expulsion, and genocide. If control is considered too difficult or costly then the extreme options may be considered, especially under the cover of war.

Secondly, genocide is often used in accompaniment with an expulsion strategy, as has been the case with Slobodan Milosevic's wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Partial genocide is executed to compel the target group to flee across the sovereign borders. Genocide can also occur partly as a result of 'failures' in expulsion policies, for example the Nazis embarked upon the 'final solution' after conquering territories, such as Poland, which had received Jews already expelled from the Reich.

Thirdly, territorial sovereignty, *de facto* rather than *de jure*, gives state officials the capacity to commit genocide on their own soil. Some have argued that the coalition against Hitler would never have come together 'had he been satisfied with killing his own fellow citizens' (Enzensberger 1990: 65). It is wrong in ethics, and now in fact, to argue that sovereignty gives the state the legal right to commit genocide, but it has been a matter of immorality and of fact that interventions to prevent genocides almost never happen, except as a by-product of other motivations for intervention. An up-sizing state, expanding through war, risks intervention against its genocidal practices because it is expansionist, far more than a contracting state or, so to speak, a stationary state. The intervention in East Pakistan by India—see Chapters 5 and 6—and in Kosovo by NATO are exceptions that confirm this rule—though Milosevic's elimination of Kosovo's autonomy and subjection of its population was portrayed, to some extent accurately, as Serbian expansionism. The intervention against Saddam Hussein's Iraq was not sparked by his genocidal massacres of Kurds but by his conquest of his co-ethnic Arab neighbours in Kuwait.

The conditions just specified that promote genocide are facilitative, rather than necessary. A necessary condition seems to be the presence of a racial, ethnic, or religious ideology which sanctions a non-universalist conception of the human species, and makes mass murder easier to accomplish, something akin to what Goldhagen identifies as 'eliminationist anti-Semitism', though he exaggerates its popular resonance. Such an ideology may be more important than a state's technological capacities for managing mass-killings, as it is the disciplined beliefs of the killers, rather than their instruments, which may best account for the scale of genocides.

Some have argued that ideological, as opposed to imperial, genocides are modern: beginning in the religious wars of the Middle Ages they have been carried further by the spread of nationalist and Marxist-Leninist doctrines. But this is partly contestable. The rise and fall of empires in modern times is the primary factor in explaining the conditions that facilitate genocide, and genocide is not 'modern', although it occurs in modern times. This proposition links back to previous arguments. If the numbers expand of industrial states that have learned the wastefulness of imperialism then we may *hope* for a reduced incidence of genocide.

Expulsion

Ethnic expulsion is a right-peopling strategy, the intended, direct or indirect, forcible movement by state officials, or sanctioned paramilitaries, of the whole or part of a community from its current homeland, usually beyond the sovereign borders of the state.[14] A population can also be forcibly 'repatriated', or pushed back towards its alleged 'homeland', as happened to blacks during the high tide of apartheid in South Africa.[15] We may distinguish two paradigm forms: creating 'Siberian exiles', that is, coerced transfers within a state or empire, and 'creating refugees', that is, the expulsions of populations

[14] Not all refugees, of course, are expellees.

[15] Forced mass-population transfers must be distinguished from agreed 'population exchanges'—e.g. those between Greece and Turkey after the war of 1919–22—the populations which move never consider such moves to be voluntary, but their fate must be distinguished from those unilaterally compelled to move. The expulsion of citizens or those who should be citizens should be distinguished from the deportation of illegal immigrants—the latter is not ethnic expulsion in the relevant sense. And lastly, ethnic expulsions must be distinguished from policies which promote differential out-migration of a target group—the latter is associated with 'control', see below. Though indirect and intentional these policies do not have the same immediately coercive character.

beyond the sovereign border. Examples of the former include the treatment of indigenous peoples throughout the world; the Irish Catholics moved by Oliver Cromwell to Connaught during 1649–50 and after; and national minorities within the Soviet Union. Examples of the latter include the expulsion of the *Volk Deutsch* from Eastern Europe after World War II; of Palestine's Arab population during the formation of Israel in 1948; of Jews from Arab states in the 1950s; of Uganda's Asians by Idi Amin; of the Greek-Cypriot community of Northern Cyprus in 1974; and, more recently, of communities within Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.

The circumstances under which ethnic expulsions are contemplated are not different from those which have occasioned genocide, but the incidence of expulsions has been much higher, notably in Europe, and the number of persons affected by this incidence has also been higher. The *World Refugee Survey 1993* estimated a total of 26 million international refugees and displaced persons at the end of 1992, of which some 23 million were attributable to ethno-national conflicts (Gurr and Harff 1994: 171, n. 1). Since then about 5 million people have at one time or another been expelled from their homelands within the former Yugoslavia. One interpretation of refugee flows can be found in the work of Aristide Zolberg and his colleagues who argue that the secular transformation of the world of empires into nation-states is accompanied by the formation of refugee populations (Zolberg 1983; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; see also Trazi 1991). Their thesis is simple: nation-building homogenization causes refugees. A similar argument is advanced by Michael Mann, who argues that ethnic expulsions are the 'dark side of democracy', the most undesirable consequence of the modern practice of vesting political legitimacy in 'the people' (Mann 1999).

Wars, civil wars, and state-collapses; colonial expansion, decolonization, and wars of national liberation—all these give rise to expulsions, as do totalitarian regimes, and exclusivist ideologies or philosophies. The pragmatic justifications of expulsions are that they are necessary on security grounds: to prevent actual or potential 'fifth columnists' betraying part or all of the relevant territory; to facilitate national liberations or secessions by establishing facts on the ground;[16] and to obtain strategically vital land and resources. They are often motivated by revenge or retribution.

Expulsions have long-run consequences. The turmoil in the Soviet Union after the start of *glasnost* and *perestroika* was partly the outcome of forced mass-population transfers executed by Lenin and Stalin and their successors, as Alexander Motyl's discussion indicates in Chapter 7. Violence in the contemporary Caucasus is, in part, the result of similar policies pursued by

[16] 'Induced population transfers' to dilute natives are a form of control (see below).

Tsarist and Ottoman emperors. The forced creation of a Palestinian 'diaspora' of expellees helped precipitate the destabilization of Jordan (Chapter 11), the Lebanon (Chapter 12), and Kuwait, and ensures that deep antagonism persists between Israelis and Palestinians. As Marc Lynch shows in Chapter 11, the status of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan remains a fundamental question in Jordanian politics, affecting the status of Jordan's borders and citizenship debates. The 'refugee question' as it is euphemistically described, for example by Peretz (1993), will shape all future debates about the political forms to emerge from any durable Middle East process, especially the prospects of a fully sovereign Palestine in West Bank and Gaza, and of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.

The sole moral merit to expulsion is that it is better to be expelled than killed. Even those expulsions regarded as 'rough justice' merit condemnation: up to 16 million Germans were expelled from Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948 (De Zayas 1994, 1977/1989, 1989). Expulsions facilitate genocidal assaults on vulnerable populations and encourage the likelihood that the victims will suffer from famine. They violate human rights and egalitarian political philosophies. Nevertheless, where peoples believe that their homelands have been stolen from them it becomes thinkable, if not justifiable, for their political élites to support and lead masses who think that retribution is in order. The leaders of new states, established after the breakdown of empires, are likely to contemplate expulsion policies, not least because their successful implementation will minimize the dangers of what might otherwise become the bases of secessionist or irredentist movements.

Right-Peopling without Murder or Deportation: Integration and Assimilation

Right-peopling the state has led several states to embrace genocide and ethnic expulsions as forms of what is revealingly called 'internal hygiene' or 'cleansing'. These horrors have ensured that the overwhelming preponderance of member-states and candidate members of the European Union now have a dominant titular nationality (Mazower 1998: ch. 2 and Tables 1–2; Mann 1999), what I call a *Staatsvolk*. But states have most frequently and less shamefacedly pursued rather different homogenization policies: integration or assimilation.

Whereas *assimilation*, through fusion or acculturation, seeks to eliminate public and private differences between people's cultures, *integration* stops at the public domain, permitting private cultural differences to be sustained. Integrating or assimilating minority national or ethnic communities into a new transcendent identity can be deployed to stabilize a new state, to inhibit secession, or to consolidate an expanded state or recently contracted state. The presence of all these motivations is discussed by Ümit Cizre in the case

of Turkey in Chapter 8. Combinations of integration or assimilation have been the official aspiration of liberal leaders in the USA, the African National Congress in South Africa, and the democratic left in those European countries seeking to include their new immigrant communities. The democratic right has also advocated integration and assimilation: the difference between the right and the left has been in the degree of concern for the relevant dominant nationality and minorities respectively.

Integrationists favour reducing the differences between ethnic communities, ensuring that the children of the (potentially rival) communities go to the same schools, socializing them in the same language and conventions, encouraging desegregationist public and private housing policies, and ensuring that the workplace is ethnically integrated through outlawing discrimination. Liberal integrationists promote bills of rights with equal rights for individuals, rather than communities. Assimilationists' policies go further. They favour the merging of ethnic identities into one already established identity, *acculturation*, for example a French identity; or into a new one, *fusion*, for example a Soviet identity. Proof of success is large-scale intermarriage across ethnic boundaries which leads first to their blurring and then to their eradication. Integrationists and assimilationists in democratic or open regimes support 'catch-all' political parties, arguing against ethnic political parties, and shun policies that might show up politically salient differences between communities.[17] They may even, as in the case of the Turkish state, outlaw ethnic parties (Chapter 8).

Integration or assimilation strategies are characteristic of states engaged in nation-building, and those with very numerically small minorities, and which therefore feel no need to grant generous forms of autonomy. Homogenization of either form may be driven by high-minded motives: ethnic pluralism may be associated with racism, sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-mindedness, and chauvinist bigotry. Thus the French state has declared that Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[18] is not applicable in France, because France has no minorities, and to admit the existence of minorities is to admit discrimination (Thornberry 1995: 21). Sometimes, however, integrationism and assimilation are merely coercive, as the Kurds of Turkey and of Iraq can testify (Chapters 8 and 9).

[17] Integrationists and assimilationists are especially sceptical about consociational arrangements which they believe entrench ethnic divisions and reward divisive political leaders—in my view this drives Lustick's criticisms of the work of Lijphart (Lustick 1997).

[18] To wit: 'In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language'.

The targets of homogenization respond in various ways, partly as a function of their perceptions of the motives lying behind the policies. Migrants, in principle, may be willing to adapt their cultures to their new host country and accept a new civic identity (integration) or acculturate (assimilation). Often integrationist or assimilationists projects are aimed at uniting (moderately) different communities against a common foe. Denise Natali in Chapter 9 shows how Kurds in pre-independent Iraq could be won over to an integrated anti-colonial struggle only to find themselves regarded by some Arabist nation-builders as surplus to requirements if they remained Kurds. Marc Lynch, in Chapter 11, addresses a fascinating integrationist challenge. Jordan, a state in transit from agraria, presides over pools of people with shared cultural heritages, but very different recent political pasts, that of being indigenous natives or expelled refugees. Its political élite does not know whether it can successfully pursue a Jordanization strategy in the face of resistance from both Palestinian and Jordanian publics as long as the sovereignty of Palestine remains an open question.

Mutually agreed integration or assimilation projects have reasonable prospects of success. They can, however, be blocked by strata of the *Staatsvolk*. Moreover, where minority communities seek more than individual fair play or equal opportunity, and insist on autonomy or self-government, or where no external threat can induce pan-community unity, integration or assimilation policies may fall on stony ground, tempting state-managers towards more extremist elimination strategies including partition, decolonization, and secession, or persuading the respective protagonists to seek some other form of conflict management including federal and consociational strategies. Assimilation or integration on contested homeland(s), however high-minded, does not work easily where it involves tacit or actual coercive assimilation on one community's terms: if one community's language, culture, religion, and national myths are given precedence then this may be regarded as *ethnocide*, the destruction of a people's culture as opposed to the physical liquidation of its members. This complaint is the standard one raised by the indigenous movements of the world, the last of the foragians. It is also the complaint of Iraqi and Turkish Kurds—see Chapters 8 and 9.

Integration and assimilation require some coercion: compulsory educational homogenization and the imposition of standard cultural codes are the Gellnerian preconditions of full citizenship. Even apparently balanced and transcendent strategies of integration or assimilation encounter significant resistance: as with Yugoslav and Soviet communism. These efforts may encounter double resistance: from minorities who see them as thinly disguised forms of cultural hegemony, and from the dominant communities who see these transcendent or pan-ethnic identities as detrimental to their

cultures: consider some Serbs' and Russians' views of 'Yugoslavism' and 'Sovietism'—see Chapter 7. Resistance to unwanted assimilation or integration projects is likely to be very high and can provoke ethnic revivals and secessionism in response, as has occurred in India, Pakistan, Turkey, and Iraq—see Chapters 5, 6, 8, and 9.

Some political engineers recommend the development of catch-all political parties to break down the salience of ethnic cleavages, that is, electoral integration. The onset of a debate around these issues in Jordan is discussed by Marc Lynch in Chapter 11. Jordanian exclusionists have done their best to try to prohibit the organization of parties with overt Palestinian identities and agendas. The belief that one can generate integrationist parties either through coercion or through heroic acts of will, is, however, fundamentally utopian if the relevant communities have already been mobilized behind different conceptions of nationalism (Barry 1991: 146). This is not a lesson yet learned by the Turkish political and judicial class that outlaws ethnic parties, especially Kurdish ethnic parties, in the hope of generating integration through cross-ethnic parties—see Ümit Cizre's analysis in Chapter 8.

The internal normative territorial logic of integration and assimilation is straightforward: ethnicity, language, religion, and history should not count in administrative theory and practice; internal borders should not publicly recognize ethnicity or, alternatively, all should recognize only one ethnic culture, that of the *Staatsvolk*. Uniform, rationalist, managerial prefectures are preferred when nations need to be built from above. The Jacobin way of dealing with the *ancien régime*, the organizational extermination of territorial particularism, is the preferred model of integrationist and assimilationist nation-builders, such as the Kemalists in Turkey discussed by Cizre—see also Gellner (1994). Integrationists and assimilationists pursue this territorial logic even within federations. In the United States 'in general . . . there is little coincidence between ethnic groups and state boundaries' (Glazer 1983: 276). The formation of the federation as a constitutionalized institution preceded the great expansion in the USA's internal ethnic diversity, and new states were generally only created and then added when they had WASP or assimilated white majorities.[19] English-speaking whites were the creators of every state 'writing its Constitution, establishing its laws, ignoring the previously settled American Indians, refusing to grant any [autonomy] rights to blacks, and making only slight concessions to French and Spanish speakers in a few states' (ibid. 284). Internal territorial homogenization, when it works, mightily assists the homogenization of peoples.

[19] There were some exceptions to this pattern as Glazer (1983) points out.

Managing Differences

But suppose state managers decide, or are forced to recognize, that 'right-peopling' homogenization strategies are neither feasible nor desirable. If they decide against down-sizing, through permitting decolonization or secession, then their primary choice is between managing ethno-national differences in either a hierarchical or egalitarian fashion.

Control

The former option points towards '*control*': the most common system of managing conflict practised in multi- or bi-ethnic states, especially in the transit from agraria to industria.[20] Coercive domination and élite co-option amongst the controlled are the themes. Controllers attempt to suppress divisions between ethnic communities, but in a partial manner, on behalf of the *Staatsvolk*, the titular dominant nationality. Their control is 'hegemonic' if it makes an overtly violent ethnic contest for state power 'unthinkable' or 'unworkable' on the part of the subordinated communities.

Control need not rest on the support of the largest ethnic community.[21] What is necessary is to have the relevant coercive apparatuses: thus ethnic minorities in Burundi, Fiji (after 1987), Liberia (before 1980), and South Africa (until 1990–1) were able to sustain control because of their control over security and policing systems. Sunni Arabs have retained control over Kurds and Shi'ites in Iraq—see Chapter 9. Control appears less feasible in liberal democracies or open regimes because they permit, indeed facilitate, group organization and mobilization; and so ethnic contests for state power become 'thinkable' and 'workable'. Irish nationalism was facilitated by the democratization of the United Kingdom (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: ch. 2). Ethnic nationalism was encouraged by *glasnost* in the Soviet Union—see Chapter 7. Bengali nationalism was facilitated by Pakistan's first state-wide elections—see Chapter 6. The liberal may conclude that parliamentary democratization spells doom to systems of control. But it is not so: controllers can surmount the difficulties.

[20] The concept was pioneered in a brilliant analysis by Ian Lustick (1979, 1987). Others use the term slightly differently (O'Leary and Arthur 1990; O'Leary and McGarry 1996: chs. 3 and 4).

[21] There is a key difference in coercive authoritarian regimes which practise control. In authoritarian empires no grand objective is pursued to eliminate ethnic difference—although they may sponsor world-religions that propagate transcendent identities. By contrast, in communist systems a new transcendent identity was proclaimed: intended to eliminate ethnic differences as irrelevant to people's identities as citizens. Though the policies of Communist parties primarily focused on suppressing the overt politicization of ethnic differences they had some success in generating Soviet—see Chapter 6—and Yugoslav identities.

To do so they must organize the dominant group and disorganize the dominated. The most obvious method is to monopolize liberal democratic institutions by a minority of the state's population and disenfranchise the rest. Citizenship and representative government are confined to the *Herrenvolk*, as in the former Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. Minority-control within regions is common: consider Serbian domination of Albanians in Kosovo (1987–99), or the treatment of the majority Bengalis in what was East Pakistan (1947–71)—see Chapter 6.[22] But control can also be exercised in states in which the entirety of the relevant state's adult population has formal access to citizenship. Democracy in its most primitive meaning is 'majority-rule', and where 'majorities' constantly fluctuate then it is an agreeable decision-rule, strongly preferable to the kind of minority-rule practised by emperors, dictators, or one-party regimes. But where there are two or more deeply established ethnic communities, and where the members of these communities do not agree on the basic institutions and policies the regime should pursue, or where the relevant communities are not internally fragmented on key policy-preferences in ways which cross-cut each other, then 'majority-rule' can easily become the instrument of control.

When simple majoritarian institutions in the electoral system and the legislature are implemented in multi-ethnic or bi-communal societies they may lead either to the consolidation of control, or to state-fragmentation through the development of civil war and secessionist movements. Northern Ireland (1920–72), the deep South of the USA (c. 1870–c. 1964), and Israel (1948–), are examples of regions or full sovereign states where formal majoritarian democracy co-existed with control over the relevant minority. In such systems the dominant bloc monopolizes the police and judicial systems, manipulates the franchise to consolidate its domination, practises economic discrimination in employment and the allocation of public expenditures, and institutional discrimination against the minority's cultural and educational system(s), and ruthlessly represses minority-discontent. Democratic government is therefore no guarantee of liberty for national or ethnic minorities.

Some, however, maintain that systems of control may be normatively defensible—for example, Lustick (1979)—primarily because they are often the only alternative to continuous war, and because consociations may not be possible. This perspective is open to the challenge that it represents a form of 'might makes right' reasoning.[23] Universalizing Lustick's argument would lead one to maintain—as some do—that the dictatorial CPSU and the

[22] Unlike Northern Ireland, Rhodesia, and South Africa, all of which have seen forms of settler control, Fiji and Malaysia are, or are becoming, forms of native control.

[23] This reasoning appears to be taken further in one of Lustick's less well-known papers (Lustick 1995). He does not agree

Yugoslav League of Communists were justified precisely because they suppressed ethnic conflict in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, that one-party states in Africa and Asia are similarly defensible, and that the reimposition of Ba'athist control over the Kurds is preferable to continuous civil war in Iraq. In any case the options in any conflict are rarely simply between those of control and continuous inter-ethnic war, although there will usually be political entrepreneurs seeking to advance precisely this argument. Some options, such as federalism, autonomy, consociation, and arbitration, have some record of success in stabilizing societies in ways that are compatible with liberal democratic norms, whereas control is easily convertible into the execution of genocide, expulsions, and other major violations of human rights. 'Down-sizing' options may be normatively more desirable than the imposition of control, as Lustick would certainly agree. If the down-sizing is moderately well executed then it should ensure that more people can enjoy legitimate self-government than would be the case under control. Under control systems the subordinated seek to 'internationalize' their plight, and thereby threaten the stability of the relevant regime as well as the regional and local international order, for example the Kurds and the Palestinians. Systems of control are vulnerable to external losses of support from liberal democratic states, and to internal corrosion through the costs that they generate. If a system of control breaks down, its practices will have added to the accumulated stock of ethnic grievances. Repression sidelines moderates, bolsters extremists and obstructs prospects for future accommodation, as Singh demonstrates has been true in the Punjab—see Chapter 5. Lastly, one might even argue in a realist fashion, although the evidence would need fastidious appraisal, that wars may 'sort matters out' more successfully than exercising control, and even create incentives for post-war co-operative behaviour.

Whatever one's judgement of these arguments, state managers preserve (or create) systems of control when there are incentives to do so. Settler regimes, or regimes built from the descendants of settlers who have preserved their differences from the natives, are the most likely candidates. New 'nationalizing states' (Brubaker 1996), especially those with large and allegedly or actually unassimilable national minorities, are also strong contenders, for example the former states of the Soviet Union—see Chapter 7.

The territorial instruments of control systems are designed to avoid down-sizing. Two stratagems are very widely used: population redistribution, and gerrymandering (see e.g. Connor 1984a: esp. ch. 9; O'Leary and McGarry 1996: ch. 3). Demographic control takes two primary forms, which can be combined: encouraging settlers to migrate into the homelands of groups targeted for control, and encouraging the out-migration of the group targeted for control. Gerrymandering, by contrast, takes the form of restructuring internal electoral or provincial borders to weaken or disorganize the targeted group(s). A national or ethnic homeland may be divided by fresh internal electoral or provincial borders, or it may be diluted by being partially or wholly encapsulated within other internal/provincial borders. Demographic control and gerrymandering may be regarded as alternatives—if people cannot be induced to move across a border the border can be moved, if borders cannot be changed peoples can be moved—but they can also be combined to disorganize targeted groups. Walker Connor's telling analysis of the USSR, China, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Vietnam demonstrates how pervasive were (or are) demographic and gerrymandering control policies in Marxist-Leninist regimes. Variations on these strategies can also be found in liberal democratic control regimes, for example in Northern Ireland (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: ch. 3). Settler-infusion strategies have been integral to Israeli state-building (Lustick 1987, 1993); of Morocco's attempts to make the Western Sahara its own; and of Indonesia's attempts to stabilize its conquest of East Timor—see Chapter 10. The Turkish State's forced urbanization of Kurdish villagers, by contrast, involves moving the natives.

Huge costs in the maintenance of control may encourage state or sub-state managers to contemplate routes to reform. There are three: considering national integration, which involves an agreement to lose formal governmental power, as happened with the apartheid regime in South Africa; moving towards a consociational bargain, as has happened with some unionists in Northern Ireland; or contemplating granting limited forms of self-government, as with Israel's recent moves on the West Bank and Gaza. In such circumstances public officials will be strongly concerned that such reforms may be stepping stones towards a complete reversal of power-relations. If all such reforms are deemed unthinkable or unworkable that leaves open the options of 'right-peopling' through genocide and expulsion, or through down-sizing, an admission of defeat.

Consociation

The most obvious antonym of control is consociation. Here differences are managed amongst equals rather than among castes in a hierarchy. Consociational or power-sharing principles, prefigured in the work of the Austro-Marxists (Hanf 1991) but first articulated in political science by Arend Lijphart, operate at the level of an entire state, or within a region of a state (Lijphart 1968, 1969, 1977). They were invented or reinvented by Dutch politicians in 1917 through till the 1960s, and by Lebanese politicians between 1943 and 1975. Malaysian politicians experimented with consociation between 1955 and 1969, Cypriots between 1960 and 1963, Fijians on and off between 1970 and 1987, and Northern Irish politicians for a brief spell in 1974. Presently the Lebanese are attempting again to rebuild a consociational settlement, as Yiftachel notes in Chapter 12, as are the Northern Irish, with British and Irish encouragement, though their precarious consociational settlement has subtle confederal dimensions (O'Leary 1999).

Consociational democracies usually have four features (Lijphart 1977):

1. *Grand coalition government* which incorporates the political parties representing the—or at least some of the—main segments of the divided society, or *government by more than a simple majority or plurality* which guarantees an inclusive executive and legislative.
2. *Proportionality rules* apply, generally, throughout the public sector: each ethnic partner in the consociation is proportionally represented in the legislature(s), in the executive, the judiciary, the civil service, and the police—the core institutions of the state. Proportionality applies both to public employment and public expenditure. Proportionality might also apply in private sector employment.
3. *Community autonomy* norms operate. Consociational partners are given self-government over those matters of most profound concern to them. In most ethnic conflicts these issues revolve around language, education, religion, culture, and the expression of national identity. Ideally consociational autonomy differs from autonomy under federal or devolved systems because members of each community have their autonomy respected irrespective of where they live and work—in short it need not be territorially confined to one section of the state or region. One can think of it as 'community federalism', or 'corporate federalism' in contrast to territorial federalism. The most obvious examples of the principle are denominationally or linguistically organized education systems.
4. Constitutional *vetoes* for minorities are entrenched. These may take various forms. In Belgium weighted majorities are required before some legislation becomes law—see Chapter 12. If Bills of Rights are established, with supreme courts to uphold them, and if these bills entrench individual as well as communal rights, they can provide an effective way of entrenching minority rights.

Consociational principles are based upon the acceptance of equal ethnic pluralism, at least amongst the partners to the bargain. They aim to secure the rights, identities, freedoms, and opportunities of the partner ethnic communities, and to create political and other social institutions that enable them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation, and with only limited integration—common formal citizenship. They do not oblige people to be schooled or housed together, although they do imply a commitment to proportionality in political and legal institutions and possibly to proportionality in economic work-organizations, since these arenas are the ones in which ethnic differences are likely to produce violence, instability, and perpetuation of conflict. Proponents of consociation maintain that in some zones of ethnic conflict the relevant populations effectively have a simple choice: between consociational democratic institutions or having no meaningful democratic institutions. The Lebanon's delicate consociational compromise was destabilized by Israel and Syria in 1975–6 and by the impact of the expelled Palestinian 'diaspora', and is presently being reconstructed after a painful and protracted civil war—see Yiftachel's discussion in Chapter 12. Another case is Northern Ireland (O'Leary 1999).

Consociational arrangements do not require academic experts: they are constantly reinvented by politicians. Consociational settlements require politicians to have the necessary motives, autonomy, and incentives to construct such compromises and the appropriate external environment (see McGarry and O'Leary 1995: 311–55; Nordlinger 1972). By no means all consociational experiments have proven successful, as the cases of Cyprus and Lebanon, discussed by Yiftachel in Chapter 12, and Northern Ireland may yet indicate. But some of them have. The case for consociation is that it involves the self-government of the relevant communities, that it can manage residentially intermingled or proximate populations, and that it is better than most of the alternatives: coercive integration or assimilation, control, bloody partition, secessionist warfare, expulsions, and genocide.

To work, consociational systems require at least three fundamental conditions to be present. First, the rival ethnic segments must not be unreservedly committed to immediate or medium-term integration or assimilation of others into 'their' nation, or to the creation of their own nation-state. Secondly, successive generations of political leaders must have the right motivations to sustain the consociational system. The leaders of the rival communities must fear the consequences of ethnic war, and desire to preserve the economic and political stability of their regions. They must believe they are incapable of governing on their own or establishing control. Their motivations may be self-interested or high-minded, but without them there is no prospect of producing and sustaining a consociational arrangement. Thirdly, the political leaders of the relevant ethnic communities must enjoy some political autonomy themselves—so that they can make compromises without being accused of treachery. If they lack confidence—for example because external irredentists outbid them—they will not be prepared to engage in hard bargaining. This condition may not only require restraint on the part of external élites outside the affected area but also within the relevant ethnic communities. This condition is most exacting, and is made more excruciating by a fundamental dilemma in constitutional design.

Proportional representation systems, which go with consociational practices, create incentives for extremist ethnic leaders to compete for office confident that they will not lower the overall support for their bloc, but each minority's extremists may lack the incentive to moderate their demands. The dangerous phenomenon of outflanking is latent in all proportional representation systems.[24] Thus we may say that a consociational settlement requires that each community be internally politically stable in a way which promotes compromise.

These are demanding requirements. If they are not present, as they have not been at crucial junctures in the history of Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Cyprus, and Fiji, then authentic consociational experiments break down. An even more depressing conclusion is also possible, though not foreordained. Consociational practices work to calm ideological, religious, linguistic, or ethnic conflicts, but do so much more easily if these conflicts have not become the bases of separate national identities. Consociation, in short, may only be practicable in moderately rather than deeply divided societies.

How does consociation relate to right-sizing; what are the territorial dimensions of consociation? State-managers may contemplate either:

(1) localized consociational settlements in ethnic frontier zones, for example where settlers and natives historically mixed; in places such as Northern Ireland where British and Irish intermingle in a former settler colonial site; or the South Tyrol where Austro-Germans and Italians are intermingled; or

(2) system-wide consociation when ethnic pluralism is pervasive throughout the state's territory.

The former option has important implications for internal right-sizing. State managers must try to ensure that the relevant provincial jurisdiction, and any internal jurisdictions within it, are acceptable to the parties to the consociational bargain. And they must manage the asymmetries that will flow between the jurisprudence and public policy of the local consociation—where collective rights may be better protected—and the rest of the integrated or assimilated state. In system-wide consociations ethnic concentrations may make 'ethno-federalism' feasible—when territorial and ethnic autonomy coincide—while strictly consociational arrangements are kept for ethnically heterogeneous regions.

[24] By contrast, in plurality-rule electoral systems, which are more congruent with control, a dominant party may have no incentive to appeal to minorities.

Outside Management—Arbitration

Arbitration is the least theorized form of ethnic conflict-management, except in international relations (Hoffman 1992). The best way to understand arbitration is in contrast with control and consociation—as set out in Table 2.1 which extends and modifies Lustick's (1979) contrast between control and consociation. The term covers both external and internal modes of arbitration (McGarry and O'Leary 1993).[25]

Arbitration requires a 'neutral', bipartisan, or multipartisan umpire, that is conflict-regulation by agents other than the directly contending parties. The 'disinterestedness' of the arbiter makes it possible to win the acquiescence if not the enthusiastic support of the contending ethno-national communities. An arbiter provides governmental effectiveness where war might otherwise prevail. Arbitration is distinguishable from *mediation* because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate. The arbiter pursues the common interests of the rival segments in the relevant society as s/he perceives them; regulates their political exchanges and presides over élites who have variable incentives to engage in responsible and co-operative behaviour. Arbitration, in principle, can establish the conditions for longer-term democratic conflict-resolution. The prerequisite is that the major ethnic segments broadly accept the arbiter's claim to neutrality.[26]

Internal arbitration can be executed by individuals not from the main antagonistic communities, for example Nyrere in post-independence Tanzania; by statesmen who are widely seen to transcend their origins, for example Tito in Yugoslavia; or who can claim a connection with all the major communities, for example Stevens in Sierra Leone. Arbitration can be performed by institutions, such as courts, and even kings, as the Jordanian monarchy has sought to show—see Chapter 11. A political party can also perform it. One-party states claim to absorb members of all ethnic communities and to regulate their rival aspirations, such as the Ba'athist party in Iraq

[25] External arbitration includes both 'co-operative internationalization' and forceful intervention by a self appointed umpire concerned to establish stability. To count as arbitration any external third-party intervention must display procedural neutrality of some kind—many interventions, of course, are indistinguishable from efforts to establish control. Imperial powers, especially prior to their departure, present themselves as arbiters.

In legal literature, adjudication is used to refer to neutral third-party intervention, coupled with an imposed decision, while arbitration can often involve non-neutral third parties such as commercial arbitrators pushing the parties towards compromise

[26] Within any community there will be activists who will challenge the neutrality of any arbiter, and there will always be co-opted 'Uncle Toms and Aunty Thomasinas' who proclaim the benign impartiality of the most blatantly partisan government.

and Syria, but it is difficult to distinguish such regimes from control systems. In a polyarchy, arbitration can be performed by a pivotal political party, one judged to be sufficiently disinterested to be able to organize a cross-ethnic bloc or chair a cross-ethnic coalition. The Indian Congress party long claimed to be a fair arbiter in the states of the Indian Union, a claim that has become steadily threadbare in the years since Nehru's death—see Chapter 5. A single external agent or a bipartisan or a multipartisan authority can perform external arbitration. Co-operative internationalization, for example through the United Nations' peacekeeping and peacemaking forces, has been performed with intermittent success in Cyprus, parts of the Middle East, Africa, and the Balkans. It is usually a sign that the relevant conflict is seen as internally insoluble and as a threat to the security of an entire region.[27] But the adjudication of the International Court of Justice shows that there are instruments for multi-party arbitration of ethnic conflicts, should states choose to develop them. Bipartisan arbitration at its fullest involves two states sharing sovereignty over a territory in the form of a condominium.[28] But it can also involve a bilateral agreement in which one state maintains sovereignty over a disputed region but consults with a neighbouring interested state over law and public policy in that region, and grants the non-sovereign neighbour a role as guardian of an ethnic minority within the relevant region.

One example is the cross-border Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1985 (O'Leary and McGarry 1996: ch. 6). The Italian and Austrian governments in 1946 came to a similar agreement over South Tyrol, ensuring the German-speaking community 'complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants within the framework of special provisions to safeguard the ethnic character and the cultural and economic development of the German-speaking element', though it took many years before the agreement was implemented (Wolff 2000). Other bilateral agreements over contested regions and national minorities existed in inter-war Europe until they were washed away in the tidal wave of Nazi up-sizing (Macartney 1934).

Arbitration has no obvious territorial imperatives: but its existence suggests a stalemate in territorial claims and counter-claims. Internal arbiters may organize a multi-ethnic federation on balance of power principles, as Tito did in Yugoslavia. They may establish multiple asymmetric forms of

[27] Churchill observed of the Balkans that it produces more violence than it can consume domestically, one reason why it has been the site of external interventions (Buchanan 1991: 2).

[28] For the merits of this idea in some situations see O'Leary and McGarry (1996: ch. 8), and O'Leary *et al.* (1993). A condominium over the West Bank between Israel and Jordan was advocated by some, especially those concerned to blunt the radical edge of Palestinian nationalism. As Marc Lynch observes in Chapter 11 one of the purposes of the Intifada was to render such an idea unworkable.

TABLE 2.1. *Comparing control, consociation, and arbitration*

Regime/Facets	Control	Consociation	Arbitration
1. Interests protected	Interests of the dominant	Common interests of the consociational partners	Common interests of groups as perceived by the arbiter
2. Linkages between groups	Extraction by the dominant from the dominated	Exchanges between groups	Regulated exchanges
3. Bargaining	Unilateral imposition is norm: hard bargaining is a sign of collapse	Bargaining is a sign of health: proportionality norms operate	Threats/bargains made to/with arbiter rather than directly with other groups
4. Role of official regime	Partisan: supports dominant titular nationality	Cipher: registers/ processes the consociational bargain(s)	Umpire
5. Normative justification	Ideology of dominant group	Common welfare/peace	Necessity
6. Relations between élites	Asymmetric: subordinated choose between co-option and rebellion	Responsible/ co-operative	May be irresponsible
7. Metaphor	Puppeteer manipulating puppet	Balancing scale	Judge in family quarrels

autonomy within otherwise unitary systems. External arbiters, by contrast, usually hold territory 'in trust', pending a political settlement—an arrangement which may come to resemble imperial government.

Managing Existing Borders

Two internal territorial principles for managing conflict-regulation, namely autonomy and federalization, are compatible with egalitarian liberal democratic norms. Another external egalitarian principle, confederalism, enables clubs of states to share specific functions jointly while preserving important sovereign prerogatives and their existing territorial configurations.

Autonomy

Autonomy—or home rule, or devolution, or regionalism, or cantonization—grants territorial rights of self-government to communities within binational or multinational or polyethnic states. Under autonomy the relevant state is subjected to an internal division in which political power is devolved to at least one—conceivably very small—other political unit. This grant of autonomy may be distinctive or asymmetrical with autonomy rights being different for different nations, regions, or ethnic communities, or uniform and symmetrical with all nations and regions treated alike.

Autonomy must be distinguished from mere administrative decentralization, common in homogenized unitary states: it is built upon the recognition of national and ethnic difference, though it may be combined with some other forms of functional or spatial decentralization. The Kingdom of Spain, after the fall of Franco, and the recent devolutionary programme in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, are examples of formally asymmetrical grants of autonomy within decentralized unitary states that are acquiring a *de facto* federal character (Hazell and O'Leary 1999).

Autonomy arrangements are usually designed to create nationally or ethnically homogeneous units where majority rule is practically coterminous with the self-government of the relevant community.[29] Where ethnic conflict is high then the further local division of existing governmental units to create homogeneity may be followed, as in the case of the Bernese Jura in Switzerland (Voutat 1992). Autonomy is intended to restructure the sites of ethnic conflict and competition into smaller and more manageable units: a negotiable form of 'limited internal secession.' Under 'rolling devolution', policing and judicial powers can be gradually devolved to those areas where the population express a wish to exercise such powers, and where it is judged that the experiment had some prospects of success.

Autonomy is, however, fraught with potential difficulties, notably in the drawing and policing of appropriate units of government in heterogeneous or mixed areas, winning consent for them, and facing the ever-present threat that policing and judicial powers might be used as preparation for creating 'liberated zones'. Asymmetrical forms of autonomy may also generate resentments—be they fiscal or representative—in other parts of the state, threatening the relevant union. Yet granting autonomy may also stave off secessionists—by recognizing the relevant ethno-national identity, and by putting the onus on secessionists to prove that independence is better than the *status quo* (Lapidoth 1997).[30]

[29] Autonomy can be designed to achieve a local form of consociation between rival ethno-national communities, especially where, as in the South Tyrol and Northern Ireland, the communities are so intermingled that a neat division is not possible.

Federalism

Federalism is similar but not coterminous with autonomy as a device for regulating multinational or polyethnic states. In a genuine federation both the central and the provincial governments enjoy constitutionally separate competencies, although they may also have concurrent powers. Unlike the forms of autonomy found in unitary or union states the central or union government of a federation usually cannot unilaterally alter the constitution—constitutional change affecting competencies requires the consent of both levels of government. Therefore federations automatically imply codified and written constitutions, and normally bicameral legislatures—in which the federal as opposed to the popular chamber may disproportionally represent, that is overrepresent, the smallest provinces.

Federations are usually built from confederations by state-managers who maintain that only an autonomous federal government can perform certain necessary functions that confederations find difficult to perform, especially a unified defence and external relations policy (Riker 1964). Multinational or ethno-federalists maintain that if the provincial borders between the components of the federation match the boundaries between the relevant national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic communities, that is, if there is a 'federal society' mapping onto a federal state, then federalism may be an effective conflict-regulating device because it has the effect of making an ethnically heterogeneous society less heterogeneous through the creation of more homogeneous subunits. However, of the seven large-scale genuine federations in long-term western democracies, only three achieve this effect: those of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland. The federations of Australia, Austria, Germany, and the USA do not achieve this effect, and therefore federalism cannot be used to explain the relative ethno-national tranquillity of Australia, post-war Austria and Germany, and the post-1860s USA—where past genocides, integrationism/assimilation, and a dominant *Staatsvolk* may be more

[30] 'Pseudo-autonomy' is a form of control. The South African National Party established a number of barren 'homelands' for blacks in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to delegitimize their demands for power at the centre. Successive Israeli governments have offered Palestinians forms of permanent autonomy that no representative Palestinian could embrace.

There also exists a grey area in territorial management of ethnic differences often found in conjunction with arbitration. International agreements can entrench the territorial autonomy of certain ethnic communities, even though the 'host state' does not generally organize itself along federalist principles: e.g. the agreement between Italy and Austria guaranteeing the autonomy of South Tyrol, or the agreement between Finland and Sweden guaranteeing the autonomy of the Åland islands.

important in explaining stability. In Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland the success of federalism in conflict-regulation, such as it is, has been based upon the historic accident that the relevant ethnic communities are quite sharply geographically segregated. Post-independence India, especially after the reorganization of internal state borders along largely linguistic boundaries, is an example of deliberate engineering to match certain ascriptive criteria with internal political borders—see Chapter 5.

Federalism is less successful for communities that are so dispersed, or small in numbers, that they cannot control federal units or provinces, for example Quebec anglophones, Flemish-speakers in Wallonia, francophones in Flanders, blacks in the USA, indigenous peoples in Australia, India, and North America. Indeed one reason federalism proved insufficient as a conflict-regulating device as Yugoslavia democratized was because there was insufficient geographical clustering of the relevant ethnic communities in relation to the existing borders.

There is a more subtle view that is rarely defended (see Horowitz 1985: chs. 14 and 15). It suggests that federations can and should be partly designed to prevent ethnic minorities from becoming local provincial majorities. The thought is that federalism's territorial merits may lie in enabling it to be used as an instrument to prevent local majoritarianism, and the attendant risks of local tyranny or secessionist incentives. Designing provincial borders, on this argument, should be done almost on 'balance of power' principles—proliferating where possible the points of power away from one focal centre, encouraging intra-ethnic conflict, and creating incentives for inter-ethnic co-operation by designing provinces without majorities, and for alignments based on non-ethnic interests. This logic is extremely interesting but empirical support for Horowitz's argument seems so far confined to the rather uninspiring case of independent Nigeria, and in most actually existing federations the redrawing of provincial borders deliberately to achieve these results could probably only be implemented by dictators.[31]

State-managers develop multi-ethnic federations for a variety of reasons. They have often evolved out of multi-ethnic colonies—to bind together the coalition opposing the imperial power. Federation may have been promoted by the colonial power in an attempt to sustain an imperial system and developed a dynamic of its own, as was true of Canada and India. A history of common colonial government usually creates élites—soldiers, bureaucrats and capitalists—with an interest in sustaining the post-colonial territory, as has

[31] Belgium may be an interesting exception: the Brussels region, created in the new Belgian federation, is neither overtly Flemish or Wallonian, and perhaps the existence of this heterogeneous region helps stabilize inter-ethnic relations in Belgium as a whole, because without Brussels, Flanders will not secede, and there is little prospect of Brussels obliging Flanders.

been true of Indonesia. Large federal states can often be sold economically—they promise a larger single market, a single currency, economies of scale, reductions in transactions' costs, and fiscal equalization. Lastly, they can be marketed as geopolitically wise, offering greater security and protection than small states.

Unfortunately federalism has a poor track-record as an ethnic conflict-regulating device, even where it allows a degree of minority self-government. Democratic federations have broken down throughout Asia and Africa, with the possible exception of India—though consider Singh's arguments in Chapter 5. Federal failures may occur because minorities continue to be outnumbered at the federal level of government. The resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundary and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own province or 'state', provide considerable incentives to attempt secession—see Motyl's reflections in Chapter 7. Secessionist breaks from federations may invite harsh responses from the rest of the federation: the disintegration of the Nigerian and American federations were halted only through millions of deaths. India, the most successful post-colonial federation, faces vigorous secessionist movements on its frontiers, especially in Kashmir and Punjab, and Canada is perennially threatened with the secession of Quebec. The threat of secession in multi-ethnic federations is such that Nordlinger (1972) excluded federalism from his list of desirable conflict-regulating practices—and the recent emergent principle of international law that permits the disintegration of federations along the lines of their existing territorial units would appear to confirm this worry (Horowitz 1998). Integrationist nation-builders in Africa have distrusted federalism precisely for this reason. It was no accident that Mobutu only offered federalism as a model for Zaïre as his power collapsed (Chapter 4). African state-builders' antipathy to federalism is now matched amongst the intellectuals of Eastern Europe who regard it as a recipe for secession, given the Czechoslovakian, Yugoslavian, and Soviet experiences. Federations have been especially fragile in bi-ethnic societies. With the possible exception of Belgium there is not a single case of successful federalism based upon dyadic or two-unit structures (Vile 1982).[32] Even relatively successful multi-ethnic federations appear to be in permanent constitutional crises: the divisions of powers must be constantly renegotiated as a result of technological advances, economic transformations, and judicial interventions.

My own research suggests that there may well be a law of federations, to wit, a stable democratic majoritarian federation requires a *Staatsvolk*—more

[32] Even the Belgian federation technically has four subunits, though it is built around a dualist ethno-linguistic division, and the EC has helped sustain the unity of Belgium.

technically, the politically effective number of ethno-national groups must be less than 2 on the ethno-national index, defined as the reciprocal of the relevant Herfindahl–Hirschman concentration index. This argument, elaborated fully in O'Leary (forthcoming), appears to be confirmed in all stable democratic federations to date. The theory underlying it is that a stable democratic federation must have a *Staatsvolk*, a national people who are demographically dominant, not necessarily a majority, and who must be the co-founders of the federation. The law has a corollary: a federation without a *Staatsvolk*, or, more technically, a multicultural federation which registers about 2 or more effective cultural groups on the relevant ethno-national index, must use supplementary consociational practices if it is to persist as a democratic federation. This is a hypothesis: a claim that consociational institutions are a necessary supplement to preserve democratic federations where there is no *Staatsvolk*.

What the law and hypothesis state may be the necessary conditions for stability in democratic multicultural federations. In liberal democratic systems the population-share of an ethno-national group can be taken as a reasonable proxy for its *potential* electoral power. A majoritarian federation must have a *Staatsvolk*, a people sufficiently confident about their place in the state that they believe that they can afford to make territorial concessions to smaller peoples. The theory also suggests that if there is no *Staatsvolk* then federalism alone, of whatever internal territorial configuration, will not be enough to sustain stability. Consociational devices will be required if the state is to be democratic, and control devices if it is to be undemocratic.

Confederation

State-managers may conceivably 'up-size' to regulate ethnic and national differences. Interstate agreements to establish confederations would, of course, mean that the confederation as a whole would be more heterogeneous than any of its member-states. Confederations have often been justified as means of resolving historic national and ethnic antagonisms (see Elazar 1994). For example, the European Union has been defended as a forum that resolved all the security and ethno-territorial disputes between France and Germany; as a mechanism that facilitated the possible and actual resolution of British–Irish and Italian–Austrian border questions; as a means through which the Northern Irish nationalists, the Tyrolese germanophones and the Basques may be interlinked with their co-nationals and co-ethnics in trans-frontier and functional cross-border programmes and institutions; and as a decision-making site through which multinational member-states will be encouraged on functionalist logic to permit a fuller flourishing of internal regional autonomy.

But one must enter strong caveats about these arguments. As Horowitz has put it

> It is . . . no accident that international integration [what I call confederation] has come to very little on a world scale. There are many reasons for this, but ethnic diversity has contributed at least its fair share. The decisive fact is that for every ethnic group that enthusiastically favours unification with a neighbouring country or countries, there is another group that vehemently and often violently opposes the idea. In ethnically divided societies, international integration becomes a central aspect of ethnic arithmetic, comparable in potency to those divisive issues, the census, immigration policy, birth rates and birth control . . . it is difficult to determine just where irredentism leaves off and international integration begins.
>
> (Horowitz 1985: 593, 595)

Among many examples, he cites how the Kurds in Iraq have forced the relevant regime in power to back off from efforts to unite with other Arab states—see also Chapter 9. As for the European Union, its success as a conflict-regulating device may in large measure be because the bulk of its members are predominantly homogenized nation-states, and that the bleak history of wars, expulsions, and genocides of this century have left many fewer possible sites of ethno-territorial antagonism for them to dispute (Mazower 1998). Groups with overt or covert irredentist ambitions may support entry into the European Union but member-states' motivations for 'up-sizing' have largely lain within the domains of security and economic policy.

Confederation may, of course, ease the pain of 'down-sizing' and/or partition. The Jordanian élite's decision to sever its claims to the West Bank, discussed by Marc Lynch in Chapter 11, carefully did not preclude the possibility of a confederation with a sovereign Palestine—to be subsequently freely negotiated. Irish nationalists in both parts of Ireland have consistently sought to build all-Ireland confederal relationships, either to dampen the impact of partition, or with the explicit intent of seeing such confederal relationships as a first step towards reunification. What may make the British-Irish Agreement over Northern Ireland of 1998 institutionally unique is the agreement in principle to have partly balancing forms of confederal relations, one set that link Northern Ireland to the Republic of Ireland through a North-South Ministerial Council, and another that link Northern Ireland to all the political jurisdictions of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland (O'Leary 1999). Neither proposal, the Palestinian-Jordanian confederation, nor the all-Irish and British-Irish confederal dual protection model, have yet been fully implemented.

Palestine is likely to be biased in the interests of the post-1967 Israeli settlers. Irredentist or 'rescue' partitions have remained rare, not least because they violate international norms against territorial seizures, but quasi- or unofficial partitions, by contrast, may be the wave of the future if NATO repeats some of its recent interventions, and if more 'collapsed states' materialize in Africa.

Partitions are facilitated if empires or states collapse, if there are some historic administrative borders that provide some cover for disguising what is otherwise experienced as 'fresh cut', and if there are territorial concentrations of ethno-national communities that will defend the new cut. The motivations that drive partitions are usually straightforward: to

(1) preserve as much territory for the core of a down-sizing state or empire;
(2) placate losing settler colonialists, or formerly dominant minorities;
(3) arbitrate the differences between allegedly or actually irreconcilable native communities; and
(4) hive off the unwanted or undesirable.

Partitions are essentially contested arrangements. Until 1988 the PLO refused to consider the partition of Palestine—calling the idea 'filastinian'. Right-wing parties in Israel still refuse to contemplate the partition of 'Eretz Israel' by an international border—'autonomy', of a very constrained type, is the limit to which they will go. The Jordanian monarchy, as Marc Lynch recounts in Chapter 11, had considerable difficulty in accepting the irreversibility of the partition of Jordan occasioned by the Israeli victory of 1967. Irredentist or unificationist movements on the part of the perceived losers normally accompany partitions of nations—as opposed to empires. These may take the form of militarized or paramilitarized conflict, or more peaceful moves to establish functional or confederal cross-border co-operation, to repair or heal the 'wound'.

Partition has its advocates who believe it may resolve ethnic conflict by allowing divorce between those ethnic communities which do not wish to live together, but the trouble is that partition rarely accomplishes a 'clean divorce', that is, bringing into being nationally homogeneous or harmonious states (see Horowitz 1998: 190–3). Pakistan, 'twice the product of partition, is testimony to the propensity of new cleavages to supplant the old' (Horowitz 1985: 591)—see Vali Nasr's discussion in Chapter 6.

When do state officials contemplate partitions? Rarely, and mostly of states that are not theirs! Let us therefore confine our attention to cases in which officials are considering their own core state, and not where they are partitioning territories to be subsequently independently governed by others. One answer is that they contemplate partition only when obliged to do so.

States resist contraction, it is said, in the way that a human being resists dismemberment. But this metaphor is correct if and only if states regard all their territories as intrinsic parts of their identity. Plainly the historical record suggests that some territories are more expendable, more suitable for load-shedding than others. States will, it seems, adjust their external borders if the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs; and sometimes they will do this because they also respect the normative principle of national self-determination.[35] On the benefit side of the calculus it is plain that contracting the sovereign borders may have the advantage of creating a more nationally homogeneous and legitimate rump-state—as has been publicly argued by Jordanian exclusionists—see Chapter 11. Down-Sizing therefore offers the prospect of a more functional industrial state. It sheds the load of governing a recalcitrant or rebellious people, and all the military, administrative, and redistributive costs that they impose on the *Staatsvolk*. These arguments are likely to be reinforced with ballot boxes—if they have access to them—and by bombs by at least some of the recalcitrant and rebellious peoples. Lastly, down-sizing allows the prospect of respect for the principle of national self-determination, leading to good neighbourly relations between the successor states. These arguments were obviously persuasive to Czech élites in 1990–2, as they were once attractive to Swedish élites in 1905, and to Malaysian élites in 1965.

The costs of contracting the core state must also be considered. These include *inter alia* the blows to national pride and prestige caused by cutting off part of what was regarded as the state's territory, the losses of legitimacy for power élites held culpable for such load-shedding, the loss of manpower and other taxable resources, and the formation of new and perhaps less defensible land and sea borders. The political management costs will be especially problematic, and difficult to calculate, when 'a clean partition' is not feasible.

Secession

Secession is something that states permit or accept, it is not something that states do: secession is an action of regions or provinces. Secession is generally down-sizing without the voluntary consent of the centre. After World War II successful secession was relatively rare. Between 1948 and 1991 only one new state, Bangladesh, was carved out of an existing state, out of the bizarre format of Pakistan Mark 1. By contrast, in the same period, the decolonization of the European and USA controlled imperial territories in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin and Caribbean America produced the

[35] Self-determination can in principle be exercised to agree to integration with the state and its *Staatsvolk*, to assimilation, or to federation and autonomy—for exemplary contemporary discussions see Moore (1998).

majority of states in the world today. Interestingly, these were not, in general, regarded as secessions. The collapse of the communist regimes of Ethiopia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union in 1989–91 has precipitated another round of secessionist state-building efforts, though on some interpretations these should also be read as decolonizations.

Despite their difficulties in achieving their goals in the twentieth century, secessionists have not gone away, and they still impact on the state system (Heraclides 1992). Some Iraqi Kurds still hope that they may get the chance to build Kurdistan under the umbrella of an American supervised domination of Northern Iraq; the KLA has similar ambitions after NATO's conquest of Kosovo. There are secessionist or semi-secessionist[36] movements in Europe, for example amongst the Basque, Corsican, Northern Irish nationalist, Scottish, Slovak, and Welsh peoples; in Canada, amongst the Quebecois; in Africa, the Polisario movement in the western Sahara, the Dinkas of the southern Sudan, and a variety of communities in the Horn of Africa; in the new republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States—see Chapter 7; and in central and south Asia, the Khalistan movement for a Sikh homeland, the Kashmiri independence movement, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka; the Tibetans in communist China, and the multiple ethnic secessionists of Myanmar.[37]

The principle of national self-determination moves these organizations and peoples against regimes that they portray as empires. The principle famously begs four questions: who are the people with this right? What are the borders within which they should exercise self-determination? What constitutes consent for change? Will the exercise of the right produce a domino-effect in which national minorities within seceding territories will seek self-determination for themselves?

In what were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union these questions were not academic. In what was the Soviet Union it was eventually accepted that each of the former republics had the right to self-determination, but there was no such agreement about peoples trapped within republics which they would rather not be within. Most of the former Soviet republics are ethnic minefields. There are many hard cases in seeking to apply the doctrine of self-determination: Northern Ireland, Quebec, Punjab, Kashmir, Sri Lanka. In moderately complex cases the principle seems indeterminate. As Ivor

[36] Semi-secessionist movements describes those seeking to leave one state to unite or reunite with another. Strict secessionists seek to create an independent state. States that seek to up-size to complete their nation-stateness are properly irredentist; semi-secessionists are unificationists (positive) or irredentists (negative).

[37] While the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are not legally part of the Israeli state the Palestinian population there want to secede from Israeli political control.

Jennings remarked 'On the surface [the principle of self-determination] seem[s] reasonable: let the people decide. It [i]s in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people' (Jennings 1956: 56). Exercising the principle is theoretically straightforward when there is no large or disgruntled ethnic minority within the relevant region affected by the proposed new independent state *and* when the seceding area includes the great majority of those who wish to leave. There are some cases where these optimum conditions have applied: Norway's secession from Sweden, and Iceland's from Denmark. More often than not the exercise of secessionist self-determination to achieve independence will create orphans, bereft of their parent nation (McGarry 1998).

There have been some ingenious answers to Jennings's question about who decides who are the people, and where. One is that every (self-defined) area within a liberal democratic state should be given the right to secede, provided the same right is extended to every sub-area within the proposed secessionist territory (Beran 1984, 1988, 1990, 1993). This argument answers the accusation that self-determination creates a dangerous domino-effect by saying that there is nothing wrong with allowing a state to fragment on the principle of self-determination; and the fact that the seceding units themselves should grant the right of self-determination within their borders should put a prudential check on the aspiration to seek self-determination in territorially problematic zones. Philosophical engagement with these arguments is now widespread (Moore 1998; O'Leary 1996).

But state officials, in general, are not liberals with their territories. The right of secession seems unlikely to be entrenched in many modern liberal democratic constitutions,[38] and it is likely to continue to have a bad press amongst liberals and socialists.[39] In part this is a geopolitical legacy. The cold

[38] One liberal democracy to have granted the right of secession is the United Kingdom. In 1949 it granted the right of secession to the Northern Ireland parliament, and in 1985 it granted the right of the people of Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland, reinforced in the 1998 *Northern Ireland Act*. This right, as Irish nationalist critics point out, was not one which the local majority of unionists were ever likely to choose—though demographic change *may* eventually remove the unionist veto. Another liberal democracy to follow suit has been Canada: in 1998 its Supreme Court in a complex judgement ruled that Quebec has the right to secede if there is a 'clear' majority in a 'clear' question in a referendum on secession. Ethiopia, which has liberal democratic aspirations, also has a secessionist clause but does not seem keen to have anyone exercise it after Eritrea's departure. The right of secession was fictionally embodied in successive Soviet constitutions, even though the Bolsheviks had ruthlessly reconquered the territories of the Tsarist Russian empire.

[39] Liberals and socialists favour lax divorce laws, but their arguments against secession have a remarkable isomorphism with those deployed against the legalization of divorce. The dangers posed to children by divorce are analogous to those posed to minorities; the reduced incentives to work-out differences between marriage-partners are analogous to those intended to establish a workable accommodation between ethnic communities; and the likelihood that one partner will benefit more

war elevated the stability of states' borders into a necessity: rather than face nuclear confrontation the two superpowers respected the borders of the other's client-states, at least in Europe. But with the collapse of the cold war, there is now much greater room for successful secession and the alteration of borders artificially frozen by the strategic interests of the superpowers—as the reunification of Germany and the fragmentation of the Balkans suggests.

In many parts of the world, especially those still in transit to industria, the claims and counter-claims of unionists, federalists, and exponents of national self-determination remain likely to produce violence. Whether implementing a claim for secessionist independence is straightforward or not, the proposal is likely to encourage key élites in the affected states to behave in chauvinistic and warlike ways: the peaceful secessions of Iceland from Denmark, or Norway from Sweden were exceptional. Ian Lustick's argument that secessionists are mostly regarded as treasonous people by unionists has full historic purchase.

What can be said of a general nature about the circumstances under which secessions are likely to be successfully executed? Two external phenomena matter: the nature of the interstate system—is it permissive or restrictive?; and the aftermath of wars—which often lead to territorial departures, often without any considerations of consent. Internally, national groups in Gellner's industria will continue to seek full self-determination, in the form of independent statehood, for a variety of reasons. They may be motivated by a reaction against ethnic discrimination and humiliation, by the pragmatic expectation that the new nation-state will have greater economic and political freedom, by the wish to have a state in which different public policies will be pursued, by the desire for power and prestige amongst nationalist élites, or to protect a given ethnic culture from extinction. Not much of a very general nature can be successfully sustained about the economic circumstances or motivations of full-scale ethnic secessionist movements (Connor 1984). Secessions are demanded both by economically advanced groups—for example Basques, Catalans, Ibos, Lombards, Sikhs, and Tamils—and by economically backward communities—East Bengalis, Karens, Kurds, and Slovaks; and secessionist communities can be located in either backward or advanced regional economies (Horowitz 1985: 229 ff.). There are good arguments for rejecting 'direct causal relationships between regional economic disparity and ethnic secession' (ibid. 235).

Enthusiasm for self-determination flows most powerfully from the democratization of the world. Democratization means that the people are to rule. The statist declares that the people are all those who are legitimately resident in a given state or political unit's borders (the civic nationalist); the nationalist that they are the nation (the ethnic nationalist). In happy cases such as Iceland, these two answers approximately coincide; in most cases they do not. The definition and championing of the people are, in most polities, up for grabs, or for hegemonic definition, as others prefer to put it, and the possibility of fragmentation enters into the fabric of any state where ethnic and civic nationalisms point to different populations as composing *the* nation. Once democratization poses the issue of the definition of the right people a clustered set of issues automatically follows: the most important of which are the definition of citizenship, the possession of the franchise, the organizational structure of the state, and the state's borders. These issues create incentives for political entrepreneurs to make party-building and vote-winning efforts out of ethnic cleavages—whether at the foundation of the state or afterwards. Politicians in multi-ethnic states have multiple incentives to manipulate ethno-national politics, as Randolph Churchill chose to play the Orange card in the UK in the 1880s. It is not possible to immunize the democratic process to exclude these issues. They are always there for mobilization by the oppressed or the opportunist or both. Those who lose out politically under existing state-arrangements and policies, whoever they may be, may always choose to try to redefine the rules of the game. If there are any economic differences between communities in a liberal democratic state,[40] then class and ethnicity may become reinforcing divisions—leading to the creation of parties with different ethnic constituencies. Where political parties are representative of all ethnic communities then party competition raises no immediate threat of destabilization, but this case will be unusual.

Democratization therefore increases the likelihood that political agents will pursue secessionist self-determination for their ethno-national or ethno-religious community, and thereby destabilize the borders of existing multinational and multi-ethnic states. But three important qualifications to this proposition are in order.

1. Border destabilization is likely to be contained if the relevant state or region exists in a milieu of other liberal democratic states. In the twentieth century liberal democracies, or at least it is now conventionally argued this way in the 'democratic peace' literature, rarely went to war against one another. Whether the complete avoidance of wars between democratic states is a systemic feature of industrial liberal democracies is not

than another from divorce is analogous to the argument that the better-off should not be allowed to secede in order to obtain material advantages.

[40] There will almost inevitably be such differences, whether or not they flow from discrimination, historic advantages/disadvantages, or differing cultural traits or preferences which give some groups an advantage in the relevant division of labour.

something about which there is definitive evidence, but wars between such entities are much less likely than wars between democracies and non-democracies, or between non-democracies and non-democracies. Spreading democracy is, however, no panacea for territorial stabilitarians: 'democracy' *per se* cannot stop all secessionist politics; indeed, as I have suggested it can encourage it.

2. There are historic, political, and sociological factors which mute the destabilizing effects of democratization upon multinational and multi-ethnic states, and may inhibit the impetus to territorial break-up, either at the moment of democratization or later. These factors include a pre-industrial history of good inter-ethnic relations at élite level; a unification of the opposition to an authoritarian or control regime before it breaks down; the internal territorial segregation of ethnic groups that may permit territorial autonomy or federal self-government—'good fences make good neighbours'; demographic dominance by a *Staatsvolk*, where the large ethnonational community group is sufficiently secure not to fear the minority or minorities, and may behave in a generous way; and demographic stability, where one or more groups are not outgrowing one another.
3. Liberal democratic states have flexible and accommodative methods for managing national and ethnic minorities—as we have seen with respect to autonomy, federalist, and consociational arrangements. Their swift, effective, and generous deployment can make it difficult for independence movements to win mandates for break-up—because it is always possible to emphasize the benefits of Union, compared with the risks of independence. To do so the relevant political centre must minimally demonstrate that the union recognizes the potentially secessionist nation(s) as (a) full co-partner(s), that the union is a co-prosperity sphere; and, not least, that the union is the best means of protecting the security of the relevant nation.

Lustick's Theory of Statal Expansion and Contraction

Partitions and secessions are often run together in the political science literature (see for example Horowitz 1985; McGarry and O'Leary 1993: ch. 1), and decolonizations and secessions are often treated as synonyms. All three involve the restructuring of sovereign territorial borders and the 'downsizing' of at least one polity, so it is not senseless that they are merged for analytical, normative, and comparative purposes. But there are subtle, though important, differences between the three concepts.

There is firstly the issue of agency: partitions are carried out 'from outside and above'; decolonization is carried out 'from within and above' by the

recently dominant core state or empire, whereas secession is executed 'from within and below'. There is secondly the question of what is being partitioned, or decolonized, and what is seceding from what. A national homeland is partitioned. A colony is decolonized by a retiring empire. A region, province, or member-state secedes from a state, a union state, a federation, or a confederation. Then, thirdly, there is the relations between the parties involved in partition, secession, and decolonization. Partition is necessarily imposed on its victims. Decolonization is seen as accompanying the emancipation of a previous inferior. Secession is the departure of an equal. A nation is liberated from an empire through decolonization; a region, province, or state breaks from a state.

Do these phrasings merely amount to a matter of partisan ethno-national 'position' and the rhetoric apposite to that position? Do 'losers' call the territorial restructuring partition? Do winners and graceful losers call it decolonization? Do losers claim that secessionists (separatists) have left them, while winners claim that they have been liberated from an empire? Ian Lustick argues that rhetorical issues are at stake, but that they are of genuine, almost symptomatic, significance—see Lustick (1993) and Chapter 3. In particular, he maintains that when the political élites at the core of a state are freely prepared to disengage from a territory they necessarily regard that territory in a colonial manner. They do not then see the territory in question—at least any longer—as a fundamental, permanent, and defining feature of the political body. It can be done without; 'disengagement' can be considered. By contrast, when the territory is seen as fully incorporated into the core, as fundamental, as a permanent and a defining component, as a vital organ of the state, then a demand for independence on the part of that territory is treated as secessionist, that is, treasonous. Lustick uses these insights to develop a theory that is used, developed, or criticized, in the contributions that follow from Chapter 4.

The core of the theory suggests that both state expansion and state contraction have two thresholds: 'a regime threshold' and 'an ideological hegemony' threshold. Take state expansion first. When a state expands into a given territory Lustick posits that this will create an 'incumbency stage', in which the territory is regarded as like a colony, capable of being disengaged from. It is weakly institutionalized. The status of the territory in the minds of political élites at the centre is entirely negotiable. But once the 'regime threshold' is crossed the status of the territory changes: to question its locus as part of the political system is now to precipitate a struggle over 'regime integrity'. A second threshold may then be crossed: that of ideological hegemony. The territory is now regarded as so integral to the meaning of the state that its status is unquestionable; it is unthinkable for political élites to consider its status as merely a question of interests, costs, and benefits. It has become part of the identity of the state.

State contraction follows a reverse trajectory. A territory's status may lose its ideologically hegemonic character, as part of the very identity of the state: it becomes a place apart. It may then be subjected to legitimate debate over the interests, costs, and benefits attaching to its continuing membership of the polity. Lastly, it may lose its regime status, and become available if not automatically scheduled for disengagement. Lustick treats these different thresholds as 'non-linear'. They can be reversed and a state can shift from the last to the first stage in catastrophic jumps.

The theory appears to imply that the difference between a state and an empire is fundamentally a question of legitimacy in the minds of the central power élite. Where a state has so incorporated territories that their status is unquestionable, when their nature is unchallenged from within the dominant political class, then state-building has been successful: the relationships between the original core and the acquired territory lose their imperial character; imperialism is rendered historic, and indeed subject to historical amnesia. By contrast, when a territory's status loses its ideologically hegemonic character then the state's relationship to that territory may be regarded by some of its dominant political class as imperial or colonial. The theory suggests that examining the public discourses of politicians at the centre, the ways in which they define and regard outlying territories, provide the best empirical indicators of the status of the relevant territories, that is, whether they are in the ideological hegemony, regime, or incumbency stages, and whether any particular threshold is being neared.

The theory is richer than the skeletal framework sketched here and Lustick elaborates it with power and eloquence in the next chapter. It has explanatory promise, and both normative and strategic resonance. The theory has micro-foundations, in so far as Lustick places the status of territories within the (transformable) constraints and preferences of ambitious politicians intent on obtaining or maintaining power. He believes that hegemonic beliefs about the nature of territories cannot be too far removed from 'reality', and he sketches a range of means through which politicians can develop strategies for crossing or reversing the two key thresholds. For example, in state-contraction they may engage in the 'rechannelling' of territorial politics through

(1) problem decomposition;
(2) regime recomposition;
(3) coalition realignment;
(4) organizing a change in the preference orderings of their followers and publics.

The subtlety of these arguments are best read in the original—but see Chapter 3.

What of difficulties? At first glance Lustick's theory appears entirely power-élite centred, ignoring the autonomous agency and reflective capacities of mass publics, the historic ethno-national character of the territories in question, or their status in Gellner's stages of history: foragia, agraria, or industria. Synthesizing the views of its critics, in reviews, at our meetings, and in our e-mail seminars, five principal difficulties with the theory can be identified (see also Kissane 1996), some of which are addressed by Lustick in his conclusions to this volume.

1. The first two objections are based on conceptual history. Lustick uses the Gramscian notion of ideological hegemony, originally developed for inter-class relations, to address the status of territory in the minds of a ruling political class—or indeed a ruling political nation. This transformation not only involves a tacit shift from class to ethno-national relations, but also, and more importantly, appears not to address the status of the peripheral territories in the eyes of their native inhabitants. Lustick addresses this challenge indirectly, in so far as he acknowledges that nationalist dissent and violence may be palpable features of reality that preclude 'ideologically hegemonic' conceptions of the relevant territory being held at the metropolitan centre—but the suggestion remains that in his thinking political constructions of reality at the metropolitan core are determinant in the last instance. This implicit argument is criticized by Oren Yiftachel in Chapter 12, and is replied to by Lustick tacitly in Chapter 3 and explicitly in Chapter 13. The status of Gramsci's own views on these matters is an interesting issue in the history of political thought, but is not treated here. What matters substantively is whether analyses of ideology, legitimacy, and hegemony can be successfully transferred from the field of class to the field of ethno-territorial politics.

2. Lustick's redefinition of the distinction between a state and an empire as something determined, in effect, in the minds of the metropolitan political class does not persuade those who regard empires as exemplars of agraria, or of early industria, that are being phased out by remorseless modernization. Critics of Lustick's theory would argue that the distinction between modern states and empires rests essentially upon the issue of mass nationalist legitimacy rather than upon the conceptions of the metropolitan power-élite.

Empires are conventionally contrasted with states in the following ways. Empires are necessarily 'large'. Empires are brought into existence by conquest. In an empire an identifiable core territorial unit—a city-state, or a national state—or ethnic/communal unit exerts domination, without mass consent, over other territorial or ethnic units (see for example Finer 1997: 8). Empires rarely achieve administrative or other forms of homogenizing integration. Some areas are subject to direct rule from the centre; others to indirect rule. Citizenship is not, in principle, universally granted to legal residents or subjects. Lastly, empires are 'star-shaped': the centre controls and co-ordinates peripheries that cannot co-ordinate with other peripheries.

Lustick's perspective, by contrast, privileges the view of the centre in determining whether a political system is a state or an empire. This may be a necessary corrective to much previous literature, but, as several contributors point out, it may not allow sufficiently either for the structural differences between states and empires that I have just highlighted, or for the strategic powers, efforts, and conceptions of peripheral agents.

The twentieth century was in some respects testimony to the power of the weak in the imperial periphery rather than to the power of ideological hegemony at the centre. The British and French were forced from some of 'their' territories after the failures of their armies to carry out successful counter-insurgencies, for example in Algeria and Ireland. The Dutch in Indonesia, the Belgians in Africa, the Spanish in Latin America, the Pacific and North Africa, and the Portuguese in Africa were all obliged to evacuate some of their colonies because of the direct costs of military pressure from insurgencies. The USA and the USSR failed to win hearts, minds, or decisive military victories in Vietnam and Afghanistan. The Vietnamese could not hold Kampuchea; the Ethiopians could not keep Eritrea; the Israelis, despite formidable weaponry could not hold southern Lebanon, at least not at an acceptable price. Lustick, of course, treats such insurgencies as 'palpable' disconfirming evidence against ideological beliefs being propagated at the centre, evidence which may change the ideological status of the territories in question from that of integrated to colonial or occupied territories. His critics nevertheless insist on the autonomous efficacy of peripheral agents in moving the borders of sovereignty, whatever the state of minds and mentalities at the imperial centre.

3. In any case Lustick's conception of what political discourse at the centre indicates about the status of a given territory may be more problematic than he suggests. This point is subtly made by Marc Lynch in Chapter 11 where he suggests that Lustick takes for granted a stable and somewhat open 'public sphere' within his core states. The 'non-discussability' of the idea of autonomy or independence for a territory or region, for example the denial of the existence of Kurds and a Kurdistan question in official Turkey—see Chapter 8—is after all, an indication of an exclusionary, militaristic control system, rather than of a successful integrated state-building project. Moreover, the very fact that the status of a territory may not be discussible by the power élite may make its members and their supporters less constitutionally flexible, and the relevant natives more, rather than less, determined

to go for independence rather than autonomy. In short, it is a strange form of ideological hegemony that renders the domination of the *Staatsvolk* more vulnerable to challenge from peripheral nationalities and ethnic communities.

4. Lustick's theory does not directly address the relevance of the historical form of the incorporation of a given territory into a state, unlike his earlier work which emphatically emphasized the co-existence of native and settlers as the key blockage to the successful permanent incorporation of a territory (Lustick 1985). Surely, we may want to argue, that it matters whether the relevant territory was acquired through conquest, through partition, through treaty, after a catastrophe, or through some permutation of these experiences? Were native élites co-opted or deleted, or did the centre's strategy vary? Were the inhabitants of the territory at the time of state-formation foragians, agrarians, or industrials? Were the conquerors or settlers agrarians or industrials? Did genocide, expulsion, and/or coercive assimilation accompany the incorporation? Were settler colonialists planted in large, medium, or small numbers, and were they territorially concentrated or dispersed? Lustick's historical work on Ireland, Algeria, and Palestine (1985, 1993) shows that he is fully aware of the importance of these matters but arguably they are not fully incorporated within the theory presented in this work, nor in his book.

5. Lastly, Lustick appears not to want to concede the independent impact of nationalism upon the morphology of states, for example the concentration or dispersion of historically constituted ethno-national groups in given regions; and the salience of ethnic groups' identification with principles of national self-determination in a democratizing and nationalizing world, the world of Gellner's industria. In Chapters 3 and 13 Lustick recognizes the independent efficacy of norms in international law, and the evolving inter-state system, in determining the morphology of states, but he does not see these as in turn independently grounded in the power of nationalism as the principle of legitimacy in the modern world. The autonomy of politics should, of course, be a heuristic principle amongst political scientists, but perhaps in this theory it is overdone.

Readers will come to their own judgements as to the merits of these criticisms of Lustick's work. Few will doubt, however, that he has provided a lucid, fertile, and intelligent theory for the comparative analysis of the right-sizing of the state. To those unpersuaded of the research programme begun here, the riposte is not that it is ideal. Our answer is simple: provide us a better one.

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